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
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
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A RHETORICAL STUDY OF THE LEPTINEAN ORATIONS.

I.—INTRODUCTORY.

The second century A. D. was peculiarly favorable to mental work. Peace and prosperity prevailed almost universally, and men had time to turn their attention to intellectual pursuits. Gibbon says (p. 216): "If a man were called to fix the period in the history of the world during which the condition of the human race was most happy and prosperous, he would without hesitation name that which elapsed from the death of Domitian to the accession of Commodus." Trajan's conquests secured peace to the empire, a peace which the ubiquitous and versatile Hadrian sought to maintain even by unwarlike means, while the reign of Antoninus Pius is justly said to be without a parallel in the history of the world. Clouds began to darken the horizon again while Marcus Aurelius was on the throne, but, with the exception of the Jewish outbreak in 132, the greater part of this century was singularly free from war and tumult. In such a time the intercommunication of peoples and the interchange of ideas became possible to a greater extent than ever before. Various religious cults, philosophical tenets, and superstitions found access to almost every nook and corner of the then known world.¹ Greek thought and Greek culture made their way into all parts of the empire. Itinerant teachers, itinerant professors of wisdom multiplied. Like their predecessors of the fifth century B. C. they were called *σοφισταί*, but they are not the same in character. In later Greek the sophist and the rhetorician are absolutely identical; in earlier Greek the sophist meant much more. Travel, which was distinctive of the sphere in the days of Gorgias and Protagoras, had now become the fashion. Even the emperors, with the exception of Antoninus, visited almost all the provinces of their vast domain²

¹ Cf. Baumgart, Aelius Aristides, pp. 62 and 91.

² Cf. Gibbon, vol. I, p. 144, note.

and aided the assimilating effect, for in this constant intercourse of the states the difference between Roman and subject was gradually fading out.

That the intellectual pursuits of the age were chiefly literary and, more than that, sophistic and epideictic, can be explained by the fact that it was not an age of progress but of decline.¹ Men sought to revive the glorious past rather than penetrate the dark future. Hence the desire arose to imitate those monuments of classic literature left by the great prose writers; for the name of poet was almost forgotten. The Greeks were happier in the selection of their models than the Romans. The latter went back beyond Cicero and affected the archaic forms and style of Ennius. Writers in the Roman tongue that are worth reading no longer appear. Greek becomes henceforth the literary language of the world. The models selected by the Greeks were Plato, Thukydides, Demosthenes; and these were imitated with a considerable degree of success. These imitators, however, keen in the perception of some things, allowed others to escape their notice. This they overdid, that they neglected. That their works want life is natural. Under the empire it was impossible, especially in Greek countries, to foster a spirit of oratory, since there were no living questions to engage attention. As a substitute, the disputes and quarrels of ancient Greece were revived, but merely as subjects for school-room declamation and rhetorical display. Of course, it was a step forward to read the works of the ancients again, but the sophistic methods could not develop this beginning, for the creative power was wanting.²

More attention was paid to the form than the thought.³ Baumgart makes the assertion (p. 39) that not a single independent thought is developed in the 55 extant orations of Aristeides. An earnest endeavor to communicate the truth was seldom found. The essential of a liberal education was an acquaintance with the idiom of the best Attic literature. The importance attached to rhetoric may be seen in the high place it occupied in the academic system of education. From the time of Vespasian the various

¹ Cf. Baumgart, p. 135.

² Cf. Schmid, *Der Atticismus in seinen Hauptvertretern von Dionysius von Halikarnass bis auf den zweiten Philostratus*: Stuttgart, 1887 and 1889. See also A. J. P. IX 99.

³ Cf. Professor Gildersleeve's analysis of "The Double Indictment" of Lucian: *Essays and Studies*, p. 305. Cf. also p. 308.

seats of learning had not suffered for want of funds. The lecturers, salaried by the imperial treasury, enjoyed an ease and position accorded to few.¹ Athens, still pre-eminent as the mistress of eloquence and learning,² had three principal chairs: rhetoric, politics, and philosophy. Of these rhetoric held the first rank and was endowed with a stipend of 10,000 drachmae, while numerous other emoluments were heaped upon the fortunate occupant. Hadrian and Antoninus Pius seem to have been especially liberal.³

Among the many sophists who, born in the various cities of Greece and Asia Minor, gravitated to the "ancient classic university of the civilized world"⁴ was the celebrated rhetorician Aelius Aristeides, surnamed Theodoros. The date of his birth is 117 A. D.⁵ From his home in Adriani, almost at the foot of the Mysian Olympus, Aristeides came to Athens and received instruction in rhetoric from the great teachers of the day, Herodes, Alexander, Aristokles, and perhaps from Polemon, though Aristeides speaks of none but Alexander.⁶ The emperor Hadrian is mentioned but once by the rhetorician; he was no longer on the throne when Aristeides made his visit to Rome.⁷ The sophist also visited Sicily, Greece, Egypt,⁸ and Asia Minor.⁹ His fame outran him. Monuments were set up in his honor in the towns through which he passed. The sickness of which he makes so much in his speeches, and which caused him to repair to the various temples of Asklepios seeking relief, came upon him, as he tells us in the beginning of the fourth Sacred Discourse, ten years before the proconsulate of Severus, which Waddington places in the year 153-4. Masson in his *Collectanea* gives 168-9. Whether Waddington is right or not in this, he is certainly wrong in assigning

¹ Les rhéteurs ou sophistes ont joué un grand rôle à l'époque des Antonins; ils étaient choyés par les chefs de l'empire, ils parvenaient aux plus hautes fonctions de l'État et ils amassaient de grandes richesses: *W. H. Waddington, Mémoire sur la chronologie de la vie du rhéteur Aélius Aristide, Paris, 1867.*

² Cf. Aristeid. Dind. I, p. 298.

³ For a picture of the age see Nettleship, *Amer. Jour. Philol.* IV 414.

⁴ Cf. Aristeid. Dind. I, p. 318.

⁵ Waddington, p. 65. So Letronne.

⁶ Dind. I, p. 134.

⁷ Waddington, p. 6.

⁸ Dind. II 347.

⁹ Cf. Daresté, *Rhetor Aristides, prolegomena.*

17 instead of 13 years to the duration of the illness.¹ See Baumgart, p. 11. Aristeides met Marcus Aurelius (with whom he formed a striking contrast in character) and delivered an oration in his presence.² During the latter part of his life the rhetorician made his home in Smyrna, from which city he wrote a letter to the emperor in 180 A. D., imploring aid for the inhabitants, who had suffered from an earthquake.³ Little more is known of his life. He died early in the reign of Commodus; according to Waddington, 185 A. D.

In the second speech of the *τερωὶ λόγοι* Aristeides gives us a full account of his sickness and wonderful cure. The most paradoxical remedies which Asklepios prescribed,⁴ the vaticinations, the extraordinary baths and so forth,⁵ are described in detail, while through it all runs a thread of self-praise. The whole of the fourth discourse is occupied with attributing to the care of the god his renown as an orator. Everywhere is the greatest stress laid on that which has reference to the field of rhetoric; but the properly medical allusions occupy so little space that Baumgart thinks they were introduced only for the purpose of recommending this new and peculiar method of healing to the hearers by means of speeches. Compare Dind. I 508-510, 518, 522. Did Aristeides betake himself to the temple of Asklepios in the firm belief that the god would point out to him through dreams how he was to regain his health? There seems to be no good reason to doubt it. How then are the extraordinary stories he relates to be explained (for extraordinary they manifestly are, and do not bear the "stamp of truth," as Welcker maintains)? Did the sophist believe them himself? Yes. At least in the main. He deceived himself, and this self-deception was the result of his peculiarly constituted nature and the incessant adulation of his hearers. He lacked critical acumen, was unsceptical, unspeculative, had no originality, but was constantly striving to be thought original,⁶ was always endeavoring to relate something truly marvellous and striking. The piety of a devotee is not to be traced in his writings, nor is he to be passed over slightly with the appellation of "lunatic," nor to be looked upon as an impostor. The modern hypnotic theory with regard to his wonderful cure is barely worth mentioning.

¹ *Mémoire*, p. 46.

² Dareste, p. 6.

³ Dareste, p. 22.

⁴ Cf. Dind. I 46.

⁵ Cf. Dind. I 67.

⁶ Cf. Dind. I 9.

Aristeides worked with the classic models ranged around his desk, as it were, and consequently we find that a desire to be extremely correct in one feature caused him to lose sight of others. He was looked upon as the model Attic prose writer of his time. How much he deviated from the Attic norm we shall see later. And here arises the question: Did Aristeides comprehend the thought, did he grasp the import as well as the form of the classic Greek literature, and did he appreciate its beauties? Baumgart says he did not. The external form alone appealed to him.¹ We need not wonder that he became very skilful in handling the Attic dialect, when we read such statements as he makes in the first Sacred Discourse: *τάς γε ἀσιτίας αὐτάς ἀπάσας καί τας ἔτι τούτων πρότερον καί μετὰ τούτων γενομένας ἡμῖν ἐν τῷ χειμῶνι τούτῳ σχεδὸν διημερεύσαμεν περὶ λόγους, γράφοντές τε καί λέγοντες καί τὰ γεγραμμένα ἐξετάζοντες· καί παρετείνουμεν οὐκ ἔλαττον ἢ εἰς μέσας νύκτας τὰ πλείω.*

The vanity and pride of the rhetorician² are seen in all his writings; everything connected with the great ego is lauded to the skies, everything foreign to it is either ridiculed or condemned. Aristeides does not use poetry as the vehicle of his thoughts; hence poetry is inferior to prose. Ancient Athens was great and glorious. Aristeides lives in a later Athens and has occasion to pronounce a panegyric on the city of his choice, and so the latter is much more fortunate than the ancient Athens. Even Demosthenes is inferior to the orator of the second century A. D., though he is a worthy rival. Plato attempted to refute the theory of Gorgias with respect to rhetoric.³ Plato is despised. Notwithstanding his polemic against Plato, the influence of the latter on Aristeides is evident on every page; only in externals, however: certain forms of expression (which the sophist uses indiscriminately), allegorical myths, numerous examples from everyday life. In this polemic we see also a side attack on the philosophers of the day. Of the three important philosophical systems of the age Aristeides seems to have had very little definite knowledge. He constantly misrepresents Plato, mostly, to all appear-

¹ (voll) höchst mangelhafter Kenntniss der Begriffe und Sachen und der souveränen Herrschaft über das Wort, p. 135.

² Sa vanite de rhéteur le poursuivant jusque dans ses rêves: Waddington, p. 58.

³ Das Ganze (of the polemic against the Gorgias of Plato) ist ein leeres trüglisches Wortgefecht: Baumgart, 33.

ances, because he does not understand him. In like manner the abuse of his contemporaries is partly explained by his ignorance of their tenets. Everywhere in his writings do we find sophistic superficiality instead of philosophic penetration, rhetorical arbitrariness instead of historical truth. To him we find a great contrast in those writers, such as the Stoics and Neo-Platonists, who busied themselves with the substance of antiquity in contradistinction to the form; but in these schools the sophistry of the period does not appear.¹ As Aristeides feels that he is superior to the philosophers of the day, so too he considers himself far above the grammarians and philologists.

A sign of the gradually increasing materialistic tendency of the times is seen in the fact that the Asklepios-cult became more and more universal, for, as we gather from Aristeides himself, this fountain-head can be used directly by the multitude, whereas the others are holy in that no one is permitted to touch them. Most of the cultivated people, however, still believed in the gods of the ancient Greek religion, but the sophists were wont to follow the religious tendencies of the age into their superstitious byways and to recount what was strange and paradoxical. In this territory, too, personal responsibility was at a minimum. Of this class of writers the chief representative was Aristeides. The ancient popular belief in its simplicity did not satisfy him; he sought for new subtleties more and more, and, like a large class of American writers to-day, delighted most in creating a sensation. For this purpose no cults were more suitable than those of Asklepios and Sarapis. But Aristeides limits himself to no god when it is a question of laudation. Any will suit his purpose, and each in turn is praised above all the others.

In Aristeides we see the extreme represented. In nothing, says Baumgart, is he superior to the average culture of his time except in a specific virtuosity: "Auf dem religiösen Gebiet sehen wir eine Exaltation herrschen, die überall bestimmt und geleitet ist von dem Bedürfniss durch Uebertreibung des Alltäglichen der leeren Phrase den Schein der Originalität zu geben." It is strange that our author makes no allusion to the Christians in his numerous works.²

¹ Dareste, p. 38, tries to make Ar. out a Neoplatonic-Stoic.

² On peut s'étonner aussi de ne pas trouver dans les écrits d'Aristide la moindre allusion aux chrétiens, tandis que Lucien se montre fort au courant de leurs doctrines, et que Galien fait l'éloge de leurs vertus et de la pureté de leurs mœurs: Waddington, p. 3.

Besides a treatise on rhetoric in two books,¹ we possess fifty-five orations and declamations of Aristeides. A large number of these are *μελέται*, or exercises. Under this head fall those orations in which the sophist seeks to show his skill by arguing first on one side of the question and then on the other. Historical subjects are invariably taken. The first two that come in this category are *Περὶ τοῦ πέμπειν βοήθειαν τοῖς ἐν Σικελίᾳ*, Nos. XXIX and XXX, in Dindorf's edition. The next two relate to the peace between the Athenians and Lacedaemonians after the disaster to the Spartans at Pylos, 424 B. C. The subsequent five, XXXIII–XXXVII, have to do with the condition of affairs in Greece immediately after the battle of Leuktra. The question is whether the Athenians shall send assistance to the Thebans or to the Lacedaemonians. In the *ὑπόθεσις τῶν Λευκτριῶν* we find the following: *ταύτην τὴν ὕλην ὁ Ἀριστείδης λαβὼν πέντε λόγους ἐμελέτησε· τὸν μὲν πρῶτον ὑπὲρ Λακεδαιμονίων, τὸν δὲ δευτερον ὑπὲρ Θηβαίων, τὸν δὲ τρίτον ὑπὲρ Α., τὸν δὲ τέταρτον ὑπὲρ Θ., τὸν δὲ πέμπτον ὑπὲρ τοῦ μηδετέροις βοηθεῖν. θαυμάζονται δὲ πάνυ ἐπὶ τῇ δεινότητι καὶ τοῖς ἐπιχειρήμασι.* The following two, XXXVIII and XXXIX, do not represent different sides of the question (whether the Thebans should become allies of the Athenians against Philip); we have the same arguments in β' as in α', only in different words; as Reiske says: *qua videtur auctor . . . aliis exemplum proponere voluisse, quomodo idem argumentum aliis atque aliis verbis tractetur.* The last two, LIII and LIV, and those with which this paper has chiefly to do, are of a character distinct from all the rest. Not only does the sophist take an ancient subject and argue pro and con, but in one he seeks to rival and in the other to defeat the greatest orator that ever lived, in his speech on the same subject. In his address to Capito, Aristeides, after speaking of this performance, says:² *εἰ νικῶ μ', οὐκ ἐχθρὸς ὁ στεφανούμενος . . . ἡγοῦμαι ταῦτόν δ' ἔπερ σὺ, μὴ βῆδρον εἶναι τὸν ἄνδρα ἐκείνον παρελθεῖν . . . ἐὰν δ' ἄρα κρατῶ, τί μοι περιέσται;* These speeches are the *λόγος πρὸς Λεπτίνην*, which was first made known from a Venetian MS by Morelli, and the *λόγος πρὸς Δημοσθένη*. Concerning the former, Morelli says in his *Prolegomena*: *Etsi vero inscriptione atque adeo auctoris nomine omnino careat Oratio, Aristidi tamen ut fidenter adjudicari possit, stilus potissimum fecit, Sophistae huic maxime proprius, aliis vero scriptoribus prorsus alienus.* Any one who has read Aristeides through can readily agree with Morelli. Menander praises Aris-

¹ Cf. Baumgart, p. 4.

² L, p. 417.

teides especially among the epideictic orators, and this speech is one of his best specimens of this kind of oratory. It seems to have found many admirers down to the last century.¹

While for Demosthenes the ground has been well worked over by Schaefer, Blass, Wolf,² Weil and others, and an abundance of information on all the necessary subjects is furnished the student, Aristeides is comparatively "an untilled field."

The Leptinea of Demosthenes is a *δευτερολογία*. It was delivered in 354 B. C., when Demosthenes was about 28 years of age.³ On the ground that a sufficient number of qualified persons could not be found to undertake the *λητουργίαι*, and further, that some who were unworthy had received the honor, Leptines, more than a year before, had proposed and carried a law which repealed the *ἀπέλεια τῶν ἐγκυκλίων λητουργιῶν* previously granted, and declared that no similar grants should be made in the future. Demosthenes' oration is directed against this law, his object being to effect its repeal. Wolf says, Proleg. 44: "Ipse quidem Leptines quis fuerit nescimus," and with reference to the law of Apsephion which is proposed in the place of that of Leptines: "Demosthenicae legis quae Leptineae opponitur, nec verba tenemus, nec totam sententiam." The Leptinea of Demosthenes contains 1608 *στίχοι*,⁴ the rival speech by Aristeides, reckoning by the number of pages in Wolf's edition, would contain about 1499, and the *λόγος πρὸς Δημοσθένη* 1204.

II.—TREATMENT.

In the very beginning Demosthenes gives in one short simple sentence the causes which induced him to assist in the prosecution. This is a mark of the *δεινότης* which characterizes the speech.

¹ One scholar writes: Certe, si quid judicare possum, videor mihi in uno hoc Oratore et subtilitatem Thucydidis, et suavitatem Herodoti, et vim denique καὶ δεινότητα Demosthenis accuratissime expressus deprehendere. Baumgart, in his preface, speaking of the high estimation in which Aristeides was formerly held, says: Auch von den Neueren haben die Meisten diesen Weg noch nicht völlig verlassen, während man in der Beurtheilung mancher Einzelheiten hin und wieder wohl auch die entgegengesetzte Richtung zu weit verfolgt hat. Bernhardt calls him (Ar.) "einen denkenden und vielseitigen Künstler."

² The edition of the Oratio adversus Leptinem with Wolf's prolegomena, Turic., 1831, is especially serviceable.

³ Dionys. ad Amm. 1, 4.

⁴ Amer. Journ. Philol., IV, p. 143.

Then he proceeds at once to the objections which his opponents will raise, and with remarkable adroitness not only prejudices the jury in his favor by seeming to divine the arguments of Leptines, but by the simple device of giving the jurors something to look at intently with the implication that they will be deceived if they do not, he also draws their attention away from his weakest side, and in the third sentence is in the midst of his argument, and that, too, of such a character as to engross the attention of his auditors.

The ending of the speech bears great similarity to the beginning. The abruptness of both is characteristic, and yet this abruptness is not harsh. It rather betokens simplicity, frankness, and directness of statement. Without any special exhortation or passionate appeal to the jurors to cast their votes in his favor, he comes down from the bema apparently satisfied to let the case be decided on its own merits.

Aristeides, on the other hand, launches at once into the abuse of both the law and its proposer. We notice here an entire lack of that adroitness, that adaptation of means to circumstances, so characteristic of Demosthenes. In the second sentence he touches a vital point in the argument, and yet in such a way that the effect on the jurors could not have been good.¹ We have here, too, the long involved sentence rolled up in a ball, as it were, and hurled at the heads of the jurymen in a manner calculated to startle, in striking contrast to the short, plain, matter-of-fact statement in the proem of Demosthenes.

We must give Aristeides the credit for preserving a kind of balance in ending his speech as compared with the beginning. He tries to make the last blow a telling one. The involved structure of the sentence, made especially tense by the frequent use of the participle, crowding thought after thought in a small compass, shows a special striving after effect. Demosthenes, too, strives after effect, but conceals the art. He is conscious of the fact that if the pains he has taken became manifest, the auditor's attention would be drawn away from the subject to the form and the speaker. The style of Aristeides throughout is neither simple nor natural, but decidedly bombastic.

¹ Wolf (Proleg. 37) : "si quis eam talem Athenis olim in suggestum attulisset . . . is sibilis explosus descendere multo citius cogeretur, etc.," and §40 : "Est autem Leptinea hujus (Dem.) ex genere quietiore, tota in docendo magis quam . . . occupata."

DEMOSTHENES.

ARISTEIDES.

D.

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PART III.

D.

A.

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100-101 94-99 102-103 76-87 12-13, 91 72-75, 4			

A glance at the above conspectus will reveal much that is interesting. The figures in the side column marked A give the sections in which the rhetorician treated the same subject as the orator, and show where Aristeides "Demostheni mordicus haeret." The order of the material gathered from the Leptinea of Demosthenes is changed considerably. Observe how closely the latter is followed toward the end in subject-matter. How much the two differ in the amount of space devoted to the same subject is also readily seen. Further, one has only to look at the part not based on Demosthenes to see the higher plane of the imitator's work. But the conspectus will be studied best in connection with the following pages.

Demosthenes first disposes of the arguments which Leptines would bring forward in respect to the ἀξία; then, in the most natural manner, this glides into a treatment of the ἐνδοξον, followed in turn by the συμφέρον. Of this important part of his subject, in which he comes into direct collision with Leptines, the orator treats at length. He prepares the way by a few general remarks, but of such a striking character, treating of a subject of the greatest interest to every Athenian, that he has secured the concentrated attention of the jurors, and is ready to turn to the practical side of the discussion (18). Here Demosthenes shows the "summum oratoriae facultatis," which is, as Wolf says, "nosse quomodo pro varietate rerum ad dicendum propositarum stilus variandus sit." How signally Aristeides fails in this can be exemplified in any part of his oration. Demosthenes takes up the arguments of his opponents, one by one, not only so clearly that the jurors follow him easily, but with such cogent reasoning that they are convinced. Add to this the unartificial dress in which his arguments are clothed, the tone of extempore speaking which runs through the whole discussion. He is talking about practical matters, hence no need of flourish and rhetoric. The style is so adapted to the sense that the impression of sincerity is carried with it, a potent factor in winning the jurors. For example, §21: ὄρα δ' οὐτως. εἰς τῶν ξένων ἀτελεῖς—δέχα θήσω * καὶ μὰ τοῦ θεοῦ, ὅπερ εἶπον ἀρτίως, οὐκ οἶμαι πέντ' εἶναι κτλ.¹

¹ Blass thinks §§24-28 have the appearance of a supplementary insertion, but it is hardly necessary to look at them in this light, since with the words *τινα οὖν βραστάων* (28) Dem. merely makes a summary before he ends the first part of his speech. Nor can I agree with him in his view of §16 sq. : "auch scheint der Gedanke durch den Satz τό τε γὰρ . . . εἶναι δοκεῖ nach-

In the second part Demosthenes passes over to a positive side (29). The case of Leukon, the most relevant of all, as far as the *συμφέρον* is concerned at least, is taken up first. Leptines' law is unjust, in that it deprives one of Athens' greatest benefactors of his rights. Leukon did not care so much for the money as the name. Another typical example is brought forward, and Epikerdes of Kyrene, who really stands in need of the money, is introduced. His services to the state, as well as the peculiar crises at which they were performed, are graphically described. In §49 Demosthenes paves the way for what follows, and by a cleverly inserted clause shows the jurors that he is not speaking for mere private ends; he has the interest of the state at heart. *ταῦτα μὲν εὐχέσθω τοῖς θεοῖς, καὶ ἡ σὺνέχομαι.* In §51 we have the connecting link and the introduction to that part of the subject relating to those persons who, because of their good-will to Athens, had been banished from their respective cities, Corinthians, Thasians, etc. In §67 the orator prepares the way, by a most natural sequence, for the treatment of the most interesting and most important part of his subject, the *ἀτέλεια* in its relation to prominent Athenian citizens. The great art of Demosthenes shows itself not merely by the position of this last section and the order in which he arranges what he is about to say, Konon's achievements, and then those of Chabrias, but also by the manner in which he introduces the subject: *πάνυ τοίνυν ἀχθοίμην ἂν, ὡς ἄνδρες δικασταί, εἰ τοῦτο μόνον δόξαίμι δίκαιον κατηγορεῖν τοῦ νόμου, ὅτι πολλοὺς ξένους ἐδεργέτας ἀφαιρεῖται τὴν ἀτέλειαν, τῶν δὲ πολιτῶν μηδὲν ἄξιον δοκοῖν ἔχειν δεῖξαι τῶν ἐδρημένων ταύτην τὴν τιμὴν κτλ.* The description of the achievements of Konon can hardly be surpassed. Demosthenes lauds him to the skies, and makes this praise stand out in greater relief by his famous comparison with Themistokles. Careful again lest the antithesis he is about to present may not have its full force—nay, may have a damaging effect, he says parenthetically: (*καὶ πρὸς Διὸς, ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, μηδεὶς φθόνῳ τὸ μέλλον ἀκούσῃ, ἀλλ' ἂν ἀληθὲς ἢ σκοπεῖτω*). The deeds of Chabrias are reserved for the close. There is peculiar propriety in this, since Demosthenes was now especially speaking for the great general's son. Notice the clever preliminary: *ἵστε μὲν οὖν καὶ ἄνευ τοῦ παρ' ἐμοῦ λόγου, ὅτι σπουδαῖος Χαβρίας ἦν ἀνὴρ, οὐ* tráglich erweitert." It is an entirely new thought. Dem. does not simply explain why the rewards are better, but why and how *βελτίους τῇ τιμῇ*. He deemed it necessary to make this clear before going on to the antithesis *παρὰ μὲν γὰρ ἐκείνοις κτλ.*

μὴν κωλύει γ' οὐδὲν κἀμὲ διὰ βραχέων ἐπιμνησθῆναι τῶν πεπραγμένων αὐτῷ. Then he rapidly recounts the services of Chabrias. In §76 the achievements are made to appear greater than they really are by the mere form in which they are moulded. The recapitulation is so rapid, the tone so confident, that the sweeping statements do not have the semblance of falsehood. As if his words could not do justice to the services of the great general, he says: ἃ δ' οὐδαμῶς ἂν εἰπὼν οἶμαι μικρὰ ποιῆσαι, ταῦθ' ὑπομνησαι πειράσομαι, and after giving an account of his most renowned achievements, calls attention to the benefit to the state resulting therefrom; then to enhance the effect adds: ἐνὶ δὲ κεφαλαίῳ, μόνος τῶν πάντων στρατηγῶν οὐ πόλιν, οὐ φρούριον, οὐ ναῦν, οὐ στρατιώτην ἀπόλεσεν οὐδὲν' ἠγούμενος ὕμῶν. All these assertions are made more forcible by the reading of the *ψηφίσματα*; and in §84 Demosthenes not only clinches his argument by the assuring manner in which he calls for the decree, but when he says λαβὲ δὴ καὶ τὸ τῷ Χαβρίᾳ ψήφισμα ψηφισθῆν, and then adds, as if the *γραμματεῖς* had some difficulty in finding it: ὄρα δὴ καὶ σκόπει· δεῖ γὰρ αὐτ' ἐνταῦθ' εἶναί που, he has also the appearance of speaking extempore. More than this, it gives him an excuse for dwelling longer upon Chabrias, and the artful beginning, ἐγὼ δ' ἔτι τοῦτ' εἰπεῖν ὑπὲρ Χαβρίου βουλομαι, serves not only to show how thoroughly the speaker is master of the situation and how little he is likely to be embarrassed by such unpleasant circumstances as he affects have occurred here, but also to convey the impression that he has by no means exhausted the subject, time alone forbidding him to proceed in this direction farther, and that he is only too glad of the opportunity to do Chabrias greater justice and show more clearly how all that he has been saying is closely connected with the *ἀτέλεια* from another point of view.

In this part of the oration there is a perfect balance. The treatment of Leukon, the most important in one way, comes first; Chabrias, the most important from another point of view, last. Epikerdes and Konon join these respectively, each a typical example, the former similar to Leukon in many respects, the latter to Chabrias. The groups of individuals intervene. The following diagram gives the arrangement and the number of sections (within a fraction) devoted to each, showing the symmetry and relative importance:

<i>Leukon,</i>	<i>Epikerdes,</i>	<i>Corinth, Thas., etc.</i>	<i>Konon,</i>	<i>Chabrias,</i>
12.	6.	18.	6.	12.

Demosthenes has cleared the way for Apsephion's law, and now, in the third part, introduces it with wonderful skill and effect. He is prepared to deal with the assertion of his opponents which he mentioned in the beginning, purposely adding *τούτῳ πλείστῳ χρήσεται τῷ λόγῳ*. At the same time he seizes upon this opportunity to show that Leptines had not introduced *his* law according to the prescribed form. Moreover, Apsephion's law is for the general good; that of Leptines is most injurious. One takes away the *ἀτέλεια* from all simply because a few unworthy persons have obtained it; the other permits all benefactors to retain what the state had once bestowed upon them, while it punishes those who have received it undeservedly. In §§98–101 the objection of Leptines is met. First the orator states the objection briefly, then follows his ever effective *ἔάσω*. Next he turns the very fact that his opponent objected to his law into an argument in his own favor: *ὁμολογεῖ μὲν εἶναι βελτίῳ καὶ δικαιότερον τόνδε τὸν νόμον οὗ τέθεικεν αὐτὸς, ὑπὲρ δὲ τοῦ πῶς τεθήσεται ποιεῖται τὸν λόγον*, and finally clinches all by the most conclusive argument given in the most lively manner in the whole oration (100–102): *ἔπειτ' ἐγγυώμεθ' ἡμεῖς, Φορμίων, ἄλλον εἴ τινα βούλεται θήσεται τὸν νόμον . . . ἐγγυώμεθα, ὑπισχνούμεθα, οἱ θεσμοθέται ταῦτα γραφόντων, ἐπὶ τοῦτο τὸ πρᾶγμα γιγνέσθω . . . εἰ δὲ ταῦτα λόγους καὶ φλυαρίας εἶναι φήσει, ἐκεῖνο γ' οὐ λόγος· αὐτὸς θέτω, καὶ μὴ λεγέτω τοῦθ' ὡς οὐ θήσομεν ἡμεῖς*. Then he concludes by a comparison of Leptines with Solon, the typical lawgiver.

In the fourth part (§105) Demosthenes turns again to the objections of Leptines. He shows that only the present laws of Athens can be taken into account. In §118 he appeals to the *δικαιοσύνη*, and in §119 uses the Socratic method of reasoning to show that it would be unjust to repeal the grants of the *ἀτέλεια*, and proceeds to make even the suspicion raised by Leptines concerning their ancestors count in his favor. Leptines brings forward another argument, that other modes of honoring benefactors are left to the state; he does not wish to take away the privilege of setting up bronze statues of those who deserve such honor, or of granting a seat in the Prytaneum. The weakness of this argument Demosthenes shows in a statement of remarkable brevity: *βταν, ὦν' ἐδώκατέ τῳ πρότερόν τι, τοῦτ' ἀφέλησθε, καὶ τὰς ὑπολοίπους ἀπίστους ποιήσατε πάσας δωρεάς*. Following up his advantage, he asks what is to become of those by whom the *ἀτέλεια* is the *only* gift received from the state. According to Leptines the liturgies

belong to the religious services. This is shown to be utterly false; the orator sets forth the great confusion of the two ideas. First he insinuates that Leptines and his associates are unscrupulous in obtaining their ends; they will accomplish their purpose at any cost, ταῦτ' ἐπὶ τῶν θεῶν ὀνόματι ποιεῖν ζητήσουσιν, and he makes this suspicion more plausible by his clear and immediate proof that the two are distinct. The whole effect is increased by the novel and imposing introduction: ὅτι δ' οὐκ ἔστι ταῦτόν ἱερῶν ἀτέλειαν ἔχειν καὶ λητουργιῶν . . . Λεπτίνην ὑμῖν αὐτὸν ἐγὼ παρασχέσομαι μάρτυρα. The secretary reads the required part of Leptines' law and the ἀντίγραφα στήλης which are necessary for the refutation, so that they can be compared side by side. The orator interrupts "καλῶς· κατάθεες," repeats the section from each himself so that it may be clearly before the minds of all, proceeds at once with the discussion, heightens the effect by putting in his questions, and refutes Leptines by the aid of Leptines. Another statement, that thieves and rogues had received the ἀτέλεια, is overthrown; the decrees by which this was granted them could not be produced; moreover, these questionable individuals had only been made πρόξενοι, something quite different. The disgrace and injustice of the measure is taken up again in the epilogue. Then we have shafts directed at Leptines and the other advocates of the law. The orator's statements become brief. He dwells a moment upon the importance of the trial, the severity of the punishment in Leptines' law, the great difference between it and all others in that they admitted exceptions according to the circumstances, which his failed to do, the impossibility of predicting that there would be no need of tyrannicides in the future, such as Harmodios and Aristogeiton. Then follows a graphic portrayal of the consequences in case the jurors vote for or against the law, and the oration is concluded with the plain formula frequently used by Demosthenes and Isaios.

What Aristeides lacks in vigor of thought, cogency of argument, and practical skill, we should expect to be compensated for by the diction and manner of treatment. In the former he is praiseworthy in a few places, but in treatment he is much inferior to Demosthenes. There are no sharp and symmetrical divisions. This is a fault to be found with most of his productions.¹ The balance found in Demosthenes is wanting. There seems to be no

¹ Cf. Dind. I, p. 10.

very definite plan on which he built his structure. The whole oration is a mass of verbiage.¹

In the proem (1-3) we have some of the more marked characteristics which distinguish Aristeides from his great predecessor. The fine irony of Demosthenes in the few places he has occasion to speak of Leptines is in striking contrast to the rough invectives of the sophist. Again, the close connection of the thought in the one is missed in the other. Just when the jurors would be likely to think they perceived the course Aristeides was about to pursue, he goes off on another tack and says *ἐν ὑστέρῳ καὶ δὴ σαφῶς ἐπιδείξω*. The antitheses in the next two sections are good. In §6 the speaker returns to what he had touched upon in the opening.² Demosthenes handles the same subject in a masterly manner. *He* also often reverts to something he has developed before, yet never except when the circumstances seem to demand it as an addition necessary for the completeness of the structure which is building, and often in such a way as to throw new light upon the entire situation or give special emphasis to the statement by the reiteration.³ Aristeides treats of the *ἀξία* in §§7-12. Demosthenes dismisses the whole subject in one sentence. He has no time for indulging in such quibbling and hair-splitting. Self-evident truths need only to be mentioned: *ἐγὼ δ' ὅτι μὲν τινῶν κατηγοροῦντα πάντας ἀφαιρεῖσθαι τὴν δωρεὰν τῶν ἀδικῶν ἐστὶν ἐάσω*. The next sentence, to be sure, shows that Phormion had said something on the subject; but Demosthenes does not haggle over what is more or less present to the minds of all; he proceeds at once to strike an effective blow. Aristeides makes little headway. Not only does it require great tension of the mind to follow him, but it is all made doubly tedious by the endless repetition of *ἄξιός* and *ἀνάξιός*.⁴ The main object of the following sections is to show

¹ Baumgart, p. 44, after speaking of the auditor's paying more attention to the form than the thought, says: So ist es erklärlich, dass da, wo wir nur ein hohles Phrasen-Gebäude erblicken, jene mit immer gesteigerter Bewunderung Akt nahmen von der kunstreichen Verknüpfung der *ιδέαι* und *ῥῆθι*.

² Nothing shows more clearly the imperfect structure of Aristeides' works than such phrases as *ἐπανάλωμεν δὲ ὅθεν ἐξέβημεν* (Dind. I, p. 65), *ἐπάνειμι δὲ ὅθεν ἐξέβην* (I 77), which he uses out of all proportion. In five speeches, IX-XIII, embracing a little more than one hundred pages, *ὅπερ ἔφη* is used seventeen times.

³ Cf. §§54, 56, 57 with what precedes; 56 with 1; 88 with what precedes; 124 with 120.

⁴ Cf. *λόγον ποιῆσθαι* in §2, where he makes a play on the words; also §§35, 36. In his treatise *περὶ ῥητορικῆς*, Dind. II, p. 43, the repetition of *στοχάζεσθαι* is positively nauseating.

up the worst side of Leptines' character, the culmination being in οὐδὲ νόμων ὄλως ἀκροῦσθαι δίκαιος εἶ. Demosthenes says (§102): ἐμοὶ δ', ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, δοκεῖ Λεπτίνης (καί μοι μηδὲν ὀργισθῆς* οὐδὲν γὰρ φλαῦρον ἐρῶ σε) ἢ οὐκ ἀνεγνωχέναι τοὺς Σόλωνος νόμους ἢ οὐ συνιέναι,¹ and again (§143), συγχωρήσεται γὰρ ὑμῖν λῦσαι περὶ ὧν αὐτὸς ἤμαρτεν. εἰ δὲ φανήσεται σπουδάζων καὶ διατεινόμενος κύριον ποιεῖν τὸν νόμον, ἐγὼ μὲν οὐκ ἔχω πῶς ἐπαινέσω, φέγειν δ' οὐ βούλομαι. Aristeides next discusses τὸ βράδιως τὸν δῆμον ἐξαπατᾶσθαι. The arrangement is poor and he scatters his fire too much. Demosthenes introduces this right in the place best suited for it, just as if it had been a block of marble hewn and polished for the special purpose of forming the capital of the structure he had been building. Nor does he neutralize the effect by tarrying on the same subject after he has reached the climax, but turns immediately to the next point. In §16 there are some very good passages, even worthy of Demosthenes, but here we see a special imitation of the latter. The rhetorician had the Leptinea well in his mind's eye while writing this speech.² More noteworthy still is his attempt (17) to do what Demosthenes (§119 and elsewhere) was so fond of doing, turn the argument of his opponent against himself. I say *attempt*, because he proceeds on the basis of an assumption for which he has no warrant. Demosthenes rarely makes an unwarranted statement, and when he does, it has the appearance of sound logic under his skilful manipulation. In §23 sqq. we find a certain vigor not foreign to the style of Demosthenes. In §26 Aristeides assumes that the ancestors of the Athenians gave rewards to those who had served the state faithfully, while Demosthenes represents his opponents as adducing as an argument on their side the fact that their ancestors did *not* bestow emoluments upon their benefactors, and so giving him an opportunity not only to shatter their argument and make a double score for himself, but also to touch upon this important subject more than once, deliver several telling blows, bring his adversaries into disrepute by mere force of argument, and enable him to weave in with greater ease his arguments about the customs of the Spartans and Thebans immediately following. Aristeides cannot keep to his subject; he wanders away and indulges in rhetorical exhibitions, endeavors to show his

¹ No doubt sarcasm underlies these words; it is but another example of the subtlety and art which Demosthenes displays.

² Cf. 23-26, 61, 66 with Dem. 11, 16, 17, 180 for words and phrases. For subject-matter see the conspectus of the speeches, pp. 12 and 13.

knowledge of Greek proverbs by using such phrases as *μετ' Ἐυρίπου Χωρεῖν*, or of mythology and history by dragging in the fable of Proteus and the philosophy of Artabanos (Hdt. 7, 9). He closes the first part of his speech with a panegyric upon Athens (39).¹

In the second part Aristeides also goes over to a positive side. The style is epideictic throughout. In §40 he recounts no less than four cases where the gods had shown themselves well-wishers of Athens. Compare the simple, direct and vigorous manner in which Demosthenes takes up the case of Leukon. The orator is practical; the rhetorician soars so far above the heads of his audience that he seems to bring on examples foreign to the subject. The former shows immediately whether the law is detrimental or not;² the latter stands so serenely upon a plane above all practical considerations that the jurors could not but have listened to him with feelings of impatience and disgust. The motif is still the care which the gods have for the city. In §42 he begins with *ἀλλ' ὅπερ ἔφη*, and repeats what he had said in 40 by tediously expanding this *ὅπερ* into a host of useless words about a point of minor importance in the argument. What follows shows clearly enough that Aristeides here, as in many other places, has to do, to quote a phrase of his own (§44), *μόθοις μάλλον ἢ πράγμασιν*. Then we have two long sentences in as many sections, in which are contrasted the ancients' treatment of those who did anything detrimental to the state, and that of the Athenians towards Leptines (45-47). Here we observe a certain excellence in form, but it is all irrelevant. The *συμφέρον* has been treated as yet in a very unsatisfactory way; hence the arguments here adduced lose much of their force.³ Demosthenes first acts on the defensive. But it is not sufficient to show simply that the law is not beneficial, and so in the second part he acts on the offensive, attacks the enemy's stronghold, and deals his most effective blows, showing that the law will be positively detrimental. In §26 Aristeides showed what their ancestors did to benefactors, here (§45)

¹Aristeides is much like Andok. in lugging in words and whole phrases from the tragedians. See Jevons, Hist. of Greek Lit. p. 453.

²Blass, Att. Bered. p. 177: "Er kennt und beherrscht auf das vollkommenste das Gebiet auf dem er verweilt und über das er nicht hinausgeht; und das Gebiet ist weder klein noch unbedeutend: die praktische Politik."

³Aristeides is, in this respect, Deinarchos magnified. Blass, Deinarch. p. 277, says: "die heftigen Angriffe geschähen nicht immer am Orte, noch auf Grund von Beweisen."

what they did to malefactors, and in §49 how most injuries are but temporary, whereas this one will be permanent. The arrangement again is not faultless. He has nothing to back his statements (§50). Demosthenes makes the *position* do half the work (§44). There is no need of a long introduction. Leukon and Epikerdes have just been placed before their eyes; how could they look for similar services in the future if they proved faithless and ungrateful to such benefactors? : οὐχὶ τὴν ἀτέλειαν ὑφαιρήσεσθε, ἀλλὰ τὸ πιστεύειν ὑμῖν, οὗ τί γένοιτ' ἂν ἀλσχίον; Aristeides still harps on the *θεοί*, and ends the second part with an attempt to show that to do wrong to benefactors is equivalent to doing wrong to the gods, who are the greatest benefactors.

The rhetorician next takes up the *δόξα*, the *μεγαλοψυχία* of Athens in ancient times, her laws and law-givers. It would be a sign of degeneracy indeed if she should now deprive her benefactors of their rights. Examples: first the most ancient (63-64), conspicuous for their number, then those of *χθῆς καὶ πρώην*, lastly, one that Demosthenes had used (66). Demosthenes would have employed his time better, pleasing as this performance may have been to an Athenian audience. What Aristeides spreads over three sections, Demosthenes dismisses in three lines (§11). What follows occupies about the same amount of space in both, but the story is told very differently. Then the sophist makes a great display (of words) with the *συμφέρον* as the basis (§§67-71), followed by a contrast between the existing laws and that of Leptines. This is tolerably well worked out, though it does not deal with facts. Once more Leptines is sharply attacked for introducing such a baneful law. In §75 he touches upon an important argument, but he disposes of the whole discussion in one genitive absolute phrase, and sallies forth again to attack Leptines. Demosthenes' great skill in presenting a subject in the clearest light is well exemplified in his treatment of the same argument (§15). First he secures the attention of the jurors by the words *νομίζω τοίνυν ὑμᾶς, ὧ ἄνδρες δικασταί, ἄμεινον ἂν περὶ τοῦ παρόντος βουλευέσασθαι*, then he raises the signal *εἰ λάκεῖνο μάθοιτε* for them to be on the alert, by a rapid stroke lays before them the principal thought unencumbered by all accoutrements, and finally to remind the jurors at this juncture what an important matter it is in the present instance, concludes *καὶ τοῦτ' ἀφαιρεῖται νῦν τῷ νόμῳ*; and again the evil effect of the law is kept before their minds by the

reiteration τοῦτ' ἀφαιρεῖται.¹ Aristeides then touches upon the important question whether the state should do what Leptines or each citizen would hesitate to do individually. Here is a good argument. Demosthenes makes the most of it (136-139); his opponents are effectually "cornered." The minor point, the well-known fact that no one would take away from a person what he had previously bestowed upon him, is dismissed in one sentence: ἄνθρωποι τοίνυν οὐδ' ἂν εἰς οὐδὲν ἄν ἰδίᾳ τινὶ δοίη, τοῦτ' ἀφέλοιτο πάλιν, ἀλλ' οὐδ' ἐπιχειρήσειεν ἄν. The important part follows, and this he treats in full. Aristeides makes nothing out of the argument. The energetic brevity of the orator gives a very different effect from the spun-out style of the rhetorician. In §82 the latter talks about the πίστις again, how the benefactors would have justly feared that the rewards would not be abiding, cannot withstand the temptation to strike at Leptines again in passing, and in 85 with ἐκεῖσε πάλιν ἐπάνειμι, returns to the subject handled in 82. Then occurs again the thought which has already found expression *ad nauseam*: οὐ μόνον δεῖ τοῦ πράττειν ἀ δεῖ μάλιστα πάντων ἡμῖν δεῖ, δεῖ καὶ θεοφιλεῖς μάλιστα πάντων ἡμεῖς κτλ., and in §88 we have a repetition of §1. The same phrases in great number are repeated. The ideas lack connection and symmetry is wanting. Leptines is again assailed and a contrast is made between the barbarians and the Athenians, the latter turning out to be the worst. The sophist would almost have you believe black is white. Two fanciful comparisons follow.

Aristeides also in the fourth part (§94) turns to particular points in Leptines' law. The tyrannicides Harmodios and Aristogeiton he takes up first and tries to show that his opponent hardly knows what he is talking about, τοῖς αὐτοῖς αὐτοῦ πολεμῶν οὐκ αἰσθάνεται. He wishes to say that by making an exception in the case of the descendants of Harmodios and Aristogeiton his law is not consistent. If the law is a benefit, why not give all the opportunity of sharing it? If not, why not deprive all? He makes one statement which but dimly expresses his meaning and, nothing daunted, makes another attempt; failing in this, he adopts a third expression; he never succeeds in getting at the kernel.² In 96 and 97 he tries to make Leptines convict himself. How poorly

¹ "Klarheit ist eine seiner bedeutendsten und hervortretendsten Eigenschaften," Blass, 183.

² Wolf says of the style of the Leptinea of Dem.: "lenia, summissa, enucleata omnia."

he succeeds may be seen by a comparison with the excellent passage in Demosthenes (§127). Repetitions again are frequent.¹ Compare §100 with Demosthenes §120, in which the latter is closely imitated. In §102 and §103, hinting at several arguments which are but reflections of Demosthenes, he passes over to the epilogue and the services of Chabrias (§104). In reserving this for the last we see a special design, and there seems to be a decided improvement. Aristeides is about to make his final bow and he does his best. He is more in his element, too. The imitation of Demosthenes is very noticeable. Section 106 is composed of one sentence, the longest of all. Demosthenes, too, has long sentences where they will accord with the sense (§§43, 52, 53), but so smooth that they are as easy to comprehend as any. The point here is well taken, too, but the whole sentence bears upon the face of it the endeavor to make it as sonorous as the Greek language would permit. In §110 the same thought is repeated with which the speech is saturated: *μάλιστα πάντων εἶ πάσχειν ἡμεῖς δίκαιοι and φιλανθρωπίας καὶ μεγαλοφυχίας τὰ κράτιστα παρὰ τῶν θεῶν ἀπολελαυκότες ἡμεῖς.*

Dionysios of Halikarnassos stamps the Leptinea of Demosthenes as *χαριέστατος ἀπάντων τῶν λόγων καὶ γραφικώτατος.* To one who has just read Demosthenes' admirable oration Aristeides appears intolerably dull.² To read him through is a laborious task.³ The most unprejudiced reader will find that his mind is on a continual strain to catch the writer's meaning, and after succeeding in this he will be more or less disgusted that he has been so poorly paid for his pains.⁴ Even where there is a semblance of beauty there is no appeal to the mind and heart.

Notwithstanding the assertion of Blass, "Unter allen demosthenischen hat die Leptinea die loseste Composition," I think I have shown that a symmetry exists throughout the whole oration, and not simply in the beginning and conclusion.⁵ It is true, the same particle recurs very often, e. g. *τοῖον* averages once in about every four sections; *καὶ μήν*, too, after 25 occurs with about

¹ Cf. esp. 99 w. 14.

² "Aristeides is jejune," Gildersleeve, A. J. P. VI 485.

³ La lecture en est souvent fastidieuse: Waddington, p. 1.

⁴ Cf. Amer. Journ. Philol. VIII 336, note; for Dem. see D. H. ad Amm. 1, 4.

⁵ The stereotyped order: proem, narrative, argument, epilogue, is not kept (Isaios saw this was not so effective, and made an innovation, which was an improvement on Lysias, and which was further developed by Dem.), but there is great symmetry from another point of view.

the same frequency. This is but another indication of one of the chief characteristics—simplicity. The balance is all the more remarkable from the fact that it is a *δευτερολογία*. Wolf, on the basis of the interpretation of the phrase *λέξεις γραφική* by the writer *περὶ ἑρμηνείας*, seems to think that the *γραφικώτατος* of Dionysios refers especially to “*laevis verborum et bene vincata oratio*” —an explanation which would ill comport with the assertion of Blass. The “*bene vincata oratio*,” however, although, as I conceive, very marked,¹ is not so prominent as to distinguish it from the other orations and call forth the statement *ἀπάντων τῶν λόγων γραφικώτατος* (even if *τῶν δικανικῶν* is to be added). What does Dionysios mean by the term? Aristotle, III 12, speaks of the *λέξεις γραφική* as opposed to the *ἀγωνιστική*, which latter he explains as *ὑποκριτικώτατη*. This evidently does not suit here, for you could not say of the *Leptinea* that the style is not suitable for speaking. Ernesti’s definition seems to be too indefinite and general: “*γραφικώτατος λόγος autem Dionysio est oratio elaboratissima et ornatissima virtutibus oratoriis*,” according to which the *Leptinea* should come under the head of the *λέξεις ἀγωνιστική*. As Dionysios does not explain the significance of the term, we must try to derive its meaning by turning our attention to the oration itself. The *χάρις* is very perceptible. What is the other most striking characteristic? It seems to me that Blass names it in the second of his three characteristics—*liveliness*.² Copious examples of this have been given in my analysis. The orator makes the jury-men see the point as it appears to his own clear mind; he never becomes tedious to them; he knows where and how to put each argument to produce the greatest effect.

Aristotle says: *ἡ μὲν οὖν ἐπιδεικτικὴ λέξις γραφικώτατη*; but this element does not occur to a very great extent in the *Leptinea*, except in the second part; it certainly does not preponderate. The second division of Aristotle, the *ἀγωνιστικὴ λέξις*, is employed in the *πρακτικῶν γένος*. Now the *Leptinea* eminently belongs to this class. Why not derive the meaning, then, of *γραφικώτατος* from the verb *γράφω* “to paint”? We know the adjective has

¹Note the statement of Dionysios that he had *κατασκευασθῆναι* himself in it. Being a native, he was much better adapted for forming judgments on this point than we.

²“Der Gesamtcharacter der *Leptinea* ist allgemeine Leichtigkeit, Lebendigkeit, und Redegewandtheit.” Blass *Antike Prosaikunst*, 17 “zierlichste.”

this signification. In Diodoros (2, 53), who was a contemporary of Dionysios, we have : ἐνια δ' (τῶν δένδρων) ἐπ' ἀμφοτέρα τὰ μέρη περικλώμενα καὶ διπλῇ τῇ καταθέσει τῶν κλάδων ἀμφίγαιτα γινόμενα γραφικὴν ἀποτελεῖ τὴν ὄψιν. Plutarch, in speaking of Herodotos, says: γραφικὸς ὁ ἀνὴρ καὶ ἡδὺς ὁ λόγος καὶ χάρις ἔπασσι, where it is joined with χάρις as in Dionysios. Compare Aristeides περὶ ῥητορικῆς, Dind. II, p. 49; σκόπει δὴ καὶ περὶ τῆς γραφικῆς . . . αὐτῆ γούν ἐστιν ἡ καὶ τὸ ῥῆμα πεποιηκῶτα τῶν πραγμάτων· οἱ γὰρ τῶν γραφέων εἰκόνας εἰκάζειν ἐποίησαν καὶ περὶ τῶν ἄλλων λέγεσθαι; p. 50: τὸ γε κάλλιστον τῆς τέχνης καὶ τελεώτατον καὶ ὅ γραφικὴν ἢ πλαστικὴν εἶναι διαφέρει, τοῦτ' ἐστὶν ἡ τοῦ χρώματος δὴ που μίξις. ἐχγὺς γὰρ ἄγει τὸ εἰκασθὲν τῆς ἀληθείας. This last sentence, in my opinion, describes exactly Demosthenes' style in the Leptinea: Leukon is seen by the jurors deprived of his immunity, and the consequent failure of the grain supplies from the Pontus as though it were already a reality, the degenerate Athenians who refuse to honor such great generals as Konon and Chabrias—in short, each baneful effect of Leptines' law is passed in rapid review, and made so vivid that they all appear to be not mere supposition, but *actuality*. That comparisons were made then, as to-day, between the art of painting and the rhetorical art there can be little doubt; in fact, we have evidence of it in the passage just cited. We can say without hesitation that Aristeides' terminology, in the main, goes back at least as far as Dionysios.¹ Compare also, for the use of γραφικός, Strabo 17, p. 806.

Of course, the technical term for vivid description is ἐνάργεια. But the important thing to be noticed here is that Dionysios, in the passage ad Ammaeum (1, 4), is not speaking of style in particular; he is not in the atmosphere of technical expressions; the words are merely thrown in incidentally as he enumerates the earlier speeches of Demosthenes. Blass himself, Att. Bered., 2te Abtheil., p. 103, gives a distinction between the two kinds of speeches which would hardly allow us to assign the Leptinea a place in the γένος ἐπιδεικτικόν: "Weiterhin tritt nun aber zwischen des Isokrates eigner Gattung und der Gerichtsrede ein bedeutender Unterschied hervor. Bei dieser ist Einfachheit und Schlichtheit die grösste Tugend; bei jener zeigt sich die Kunst des Redners offen und möglichst glanzend."

When we read what Dionysios says in chapter 45 of his De admiranda vi dicendi in Dem., we are tempted at first sight to

¹ See Baumgart, Aelius Aristides, 2te Abtheil.

give γραφικώτατος its technical signification. But on closer inspection we find additional proof of the meaning we have assigned to it. When we read πανηγυρικὴν and remember this is equivalent to ἐπιδεικτικὴν, which in its technical signification is almost synonymous with γραφικὴν, and then just below are confronted with the statement κὰν τῷ κατὰ Λεπτίνου, the question seems to be settled at once. But just before this statement we have ὡς ἐν τῷ κατὰ Ἀριστοκράτους, and just after κὰν τῷ περὶ τοῦ στεφάνου, καὶ ἐν ἄλλοις συχνοῖς. The Leptinea is neither mentioned first nor is there a distinct statement that the epideictic element reaches its maximum in this speech. On the contrary, what is said of the Leptinea is also virtually said of the speech against Aristokrates. Hence Dionysios says nothing from which we can infer that in the term γραφικώτατος he has reference to the epideictic element of the Leptinea.

Reiske declares Aristeides to be more difficult than any of the Greek orators, Thukydides alone in his speeches being an exception, and Wolf remarks on this performance of the rhetorician: "Mihi autem perquam vile et contemnendum est." Whether we praise the great orator's Leptinea for its subtlety with Cicero,¹ or for the beauty and nobility of its sentiments and the force of its arguments with Wolf,² who places it next to the Crown, we must deny that praise in all these particulars to his would-be rival.³

III.—COMPOSITION.

A.—*Rhythm*. Cicero says:⁴ "Cujus (Dem.) non tam vibrarent fulmina illa nisi numeris contorta ferrentur." Although these words do not apply so much to the Leptinea, yet even here the rhythm is not to be neglected; it helps much to bring about the χάρις.⁵ The first two sections may be divided into the following:

¹ Orator, 31, III.

² Proleg. 42-44; cf. Plut. Dem. 13.

³ Cf. Baumgart, Aelius Aristides, Vorwort; also Aristeid. XXVI, Dind. I, p. 507: ἔπειτα λέγειν περὶ τῶν λόγων τῶν ἐμῶν εἰς ὅσον προβεβηκότες εἰεν, μνησθῆναι μὲν δὴ Πλάτωνος καὶ Δημοσθένους, ἐφ' οἷσπερ ἐμνήσθη ἑκατέρου· ἀκροτελεῦτιον δ' ἐπιθεῖναι, παρῆλθες ἡμῖν τῷ ἀξιωματι τὸν Δημοσθένη, ὡς ἡδ' αὐτοῖς ἄρα τοῖς φιλοσόφοις εἶναι ὑπερφρονῆσαι. τοῦτο τὸ ῥῆμα πᾶσαν ἐμὸν τὴν ὑστερον φιλοτιμίαν ἐξήψε, τοῦτ' ἐποίησε πᾶν ὄτι ποιῶν περὶ λόγους ἔλαττον εἶναι τοῦ δέοντος νομίζειν.

⁴ Orator, 234.

⁵ See Dionys. Dem. 47.

10. $\cup\cup\cup | \text{--} | \cup\cup\text{--} | \cup\text{--}$. Iambic dimeter (almost).
 11. $\text{--}\cup : \text{--} | \text{--} | \text{--}\cup\cup | \text{--}\cup\cup | \text{--}\cup || \text{--}\cup\cup$. Dactylic.
 12. $\cup\cup : \cup\cup\cup\text{--}$. Clausula esp. sought after.
 13. $\cup\text{--}\text{--} | \text{--}\cup\text{--}$. First and second epitrite.

Finally, the closing part of the oration.

§167.—1. $\text{--}\cup\cup | \text{--} | \text{--}\cup\cup$. 2. $\text{--}\cup\cup | \text{--}\cup\cup | \text{--} || \cup\text{--}\cup\cup$.
 Half of hexam.

3. $\cup\text{--} | \text{--} | \text{--}\cup$.

4. $\cup\text{--} : \text{--} | \text{--}\cup | \text{--} | \text{--}\cup\cup | \text{--}\cup\cup | \text{--}\cup || \text{--}\text{--}\text{--}\text{--}$.

Dactyl. hexam. (almost).

5. $\text{--}\text{--}\cup\text{--}$.

6. $\text{--} | \text{--}\cup\cup | \text{--}\cup\cup | \text{--} | \text{--}\cup\cup || \cup\text{--} | \cup\text{--} | \text{--} \dagger \cup\text{--} | \text{--}\cup\cup$.

Hexam. (5 ft.) + iamb. trim. catalec. minus one mora.

7. $\cup\text{--} | \text{--}\cup || \text{--} | \text{--}\cup\cup | \text{--} | \text{--} | \cup\cup\text{--} | \text{--}\cup\cup$.

Cretic and anapaestic.

8. $\text{--}\text{--}\text{--}\text{--}\cup\text{--}$.

Too much stress must not be laid on the rhythm of Demosthenes as indicated by these metrical divisions. The most noteworthy point is, they serve to show how the orator intermingled his longs and shorts—so that they will submit to metrical treatment¹ and thus become the visible exponent of the general movement of the language. To try to make poetry out of this prose would be overdoing it.

The kola of Aristeides present the following arrangement :

- I.—§1. 1. $\text{--}\cup\text{--}\text{--}\text{--}\cup\cup\cup\text{--}\cup$. 2. $\cup\text{--}\text{--}\cup\cup\cup\text{--}\cup\text{--}\cup\cup\cup\cup$
 $\text{--}\cup\text{--}$. 3. $\text{--}\text{--}\cup\text{--}$. 4. $\text{--}\cup\cup\cup\text{--}\text{--}$. 5. $\text{--}\cup\cup\text{--}\cup$. 6. $\cup\cup\cup\cup$.
 7. $\cup\cup\cup\text{--}\cup\cup\cup$. 8. $\text{--}\cup\cup\cup\cup\cup\cup\text{--}\cup\text{--}$. 9. $\text{--}\cup\cup\text{--}\text{--}\cup$
 $\text{--}\cup\cup\text{--}\cup\cup\cup\text{--}\cup\text{--}$. 10. $\text{--}\cup\cup\cup\cup\text{--}\cup\cup\text{--}$. 11. $\text{--}\cup\cup\cup\text{--}$
 $\text{--}\cup\cup\cup$. 12. $\cup\text{--}\text{--}\text{--}\cup\cup\text{--}\cup\text{--}$. 13. $\text{--}\cup\cup\text{--}\text{--}\cup\cup\cup$
 $\text{--}\cup\cup\cup\text{--}$.

A glance over these quantities will show that although here and there we can obtain as good a verse, or part of one, as generally in Demosthenes, yet throughout there does not exist the same

¹ The rhythm accords with Isokrates' directions. See Blass, *Att. Bered.*, *ste Abth.*, p. 105.

readiness to yield to the requirements of metrical division. In the first kolon we have the last four feet of a hexameter; in the second we have a goodly number of cretics; in the seventh an admissible iambic dimeter. The attempt, however, to force all the kola into verse would result in failure. The cumulation of long or short syllables forbids this. The contrast with the distribution made by Demosthenes is very marked. The great length of the kola is also to be noticed.

II.—The second example I have chosen (65) is similar in contents to that of Demosthenes:

I. ———— 2. ————
 ———— 3. ———— 4. ————
 ———— 5. ———— 6. ————
 ———— 7. ————
 8. ———— 10. ———— 11.
 ————

The remarks above hold good here also. Aristeides in this section shows a greater lack of that Demosthenean skill in ending a kolon than in the preceding. Especially to be noted in his favor is the perfect hexameter in the first kolon and the succession of dactyls in the sixth.

III.—The last section, 112:

I. ———— 2. ———— 3. ————
 ———— 4. ————
 5. ———— 6. ———— 7. ————
 ———— 8. ———— 9. ————
 ———— 10. ————

The only metrical groups worthy of notice are the approach to a hexameter in No. 3 and the specimens of the epitrite in No. 5.

Consequently, although the *Leptinea* of Demosthenes is not so polished as some of his later orations, we see a great superiority over Aristeides. There could be no more conclusive proof of the care with which the orator composed his speeches. The rhythm is not accidental; the difference in regard to the avoidance of hiatus between Demosthenes and his would-be rival is not mere chance. The latter imitates the orator with great exactness in some points, but in others he either does not observe the divergence from his model or he does not attempt to follow him.

B.—*Cumulation of short syllables.* Blass lays down the law for Demosthenes: "Die Anhäufung von mehr als zwei kurzen

Silben möglichst vermieden wird." There are 43 examples in the Leptinea of three or more short syllables in succession (not counting those that occur all in one word). Of these ten may be cancelled, since they either do not produce the effect of separate words or from other reasons are unobjectionable, as οὗτος ὁ νόμος, εἶτε δὲ, δῆλον ἔστι. In many places the cause for a certain position of the words can be traced to this desire of avoiding the heaping up of short syllables, as μάλ' ἔχων νόμος καλῶς (152), where μάλα limits καλῶς, but is separated from it by two words. Of three successive short syllables in the same word there are 40 examples, seven of these being forms of γίγνεσθαι.

In Aristeides (Wolf's text) I find 205 examples. Of course, those in Demosthenes have been reduced to a minimum by modern criticism, as also the cases of hiatus, whereas the text of Aristeides is still in its crude state. Of these 205 examples 46 could very well be struck out. He has still, however, 159 to Demosthenes' 33. Of single words containing three successive short syllables Aristeides has 67 examples. Eleven of these are νομοθετεῖν, νομοθετικούς, and the like; seven from the verb γίγνεσθαι.

C.—*Hiatus*. That Demosthenes took especial care to avoid hiatus is well known. The number of examples in the Leptinea is exceedingly small.¹ Some of these are explained by the pause, others are due to the corruption of the text.

Aristeides has about 90 examples of hiatus (not counting καὶ ὤς, δι' ὧν, ἧ εἰ and the like, in which case there would be some 250). But when we observe that this number can be reduced at least one-half by striking out all the examples which are capable of being removed by elision and other means, the number does not look quite so formidable; and yet the examples are still by no means so rare as in Demosthenes.

IV.—RHETORICAL FIGURES.

I. ὁμοιοτέλευτον. These the rhetorician and the orator have with about the same frequency, but neither very often. As an example from Demosthenes I cite from the last chapter ἂ δίκαι' ἐγνώκατε, τὰτα φυλαξάτε καὶ μνημονεύετε; from Aristeides ποιεῖν καὶ λέγειν καὶ ψήθημεν δεῖν (19); see also 11, 26, 56. Further, compare αἱ πικρὰ τῶν δόμων δωρεαὶ τῶν παρὰ τῶν ἄλλων πολιτειῶν διδομένων (Dem. 15) with πλείστον δὲ τινῶν ἀδρῶν καὶ τῶν γὰρ τῶν.

¹ See Benseler, de Hiatu in Oratoribus Atticis, pp. 103-108.

2. *ἀντιθέσεις*. It is in the use of the antithesis especially, as I have already hinted, that the rhetorician seeks to rival the orator. Its value was recognized by Aristotle,¹ who says the opposed parts are made extraordinarily clear by the juxtaposition, and there is awakened in the auditor the agreeable feeling of easy perception. In Demosthenes the number of antitheses is not so great as might be expected, but the very fact that they do not occur so often increases the value of each one. The sharpness and exactness of these few is exceptionally great,² while Aristeides, in his long antitheses, striving after a sonorous sentence, sometimes seems to forget the peculiar function of this figure. Demosthenes reinforces the sense of hearing. His arguments are *heard*, but at the same time, by this antithetical arrangement, he puts before the mental vision of the audience, for comparison, the two thoughts side by side, and tacitly says in arranging them so: "Here they are; look at them; judge for yourselves." The following are the chief examples: 6, 12, 16, 26, 30, 35, 56, 57, 62, 65, 66, 67, 69, 71, 72, 74, 79, 80, 81, 86, 95, 99, 102, 103, 107, 108, 109, 114, 116, 123, 129, 138, 139, 143, 148, 149, 165, 166. Especially good are: *παρὰ μὲν γὰρ ἐκείνοις μείζων ἐστὶν ὁ τοῦ μέλλοντος φόβος τῆς παρούσης χάριτος, παρὰ δ' ὑμῖν ἀδεῶς ἂν λάβῃ τις, ἔχειν ὑπῆρξεν τὸν γοῦν ἄλλον χρόνον* (16); *παρὰ μὲν γὰρ τὰς ἐπὶ τῶν χορηγιῶν δαπάνας ἡμέρας μέρος ἢ χάρις τοῖς θεωμένοις ἡμῶν, παρὰ δὲ τὰς τῶν εἰς τὸν πόλεμον παρασκευῶν ἀφθονίας πάντα τὸν χρόνον ἢ σωτηρία πάσῃ τῇ πόλει* (26).³

The number of antitheses in Aristeides is not so large, but the proportion, as far as the amount of space taken up is concerned, is somewhat larger. There are 25 marked examples.

3. *ἀσύνθετον*. This is not found so often in the Leptinea as in the other orations; there is not so much passion.⁴ We have several examples, however. Now Demosthenes employs this,

¹ Rhet. III 9.

² So Jevons, *Hist. of Greek Lit.* p. 421 (after Blass), speaking of Demosthenes: "not in the sense that he is perpetually using them as though he loved them, making them very sharp and bringing them down with tremendous effect."

³ The home of the antithesis is the argument. Demosthenes uses it mostly here; Aristeides does not confine himself to these limits.

⁴ So we find that in two particulars this speech bears a great resemblance to the speeches of Lysias: 1st, in having that indefinable grace (*χάρις*); 2d, in lacking movement, the whirlwind of passion (*πάθος*)—exactly the opposite of such a speech as the one against Meidias.

now he makes use of the opposite figure, polysyndeton, as the sense demands: 10, 60, 78, 104, 122, 142, 158, 164. The first is a good example of its use in summing up, one of the instances in which it is most frequently employed: *τρία γὰρ τὰ μέγιστ' ὀνείδη κῆται, φθονεροῦς, ἀπίστους, ἀχαρίστους εἶναι δοκεῖν*. In 78 a certain vigor is given to the utterance by this figure: *οὐ πόλιν, οὐ φρούριον, οὐ ναῦν, οὐ στρατιώτην ἀπώλεσεν οὐδὲν ἡγούμενος ἑμῶν*.¹ The omission of the conjunction necessitates a pause; hence the full significance of each single word and the relation to the whole is more readily grasped and more deeply impressed.

Aristeides has not a single example of asyndeton in his speech against Leptines, and this is one cause of the exceeding monotony. But we must not judge by this oration of what Aristeides could do in this line. See the following: Dind. I, pp. 11, 69, 79, 101, 117, 132, 134, 147, 208, 226, 231, 240, 278, 293, 300, 327, 364, 706, 774, 805, 838; II 340, 381, 383, 404. The sophist makes the Greek language not the minister, but the drapery of his thought. There is much tinsel and little pure gold. He daubs on the paint here and scarcely touches the canvas there. A word, a phrase, a figure is seized upon and made to do so much service that it drops finally, as one might think, from sheer exhaustion, and does not revive again for pages. *ὡς εἰπεῖν* is done to death—in one part of his work a dozen times in 25 pages. You might fish for *οἶμαι* or *εἰκότως* long in vain and all of a sudden come upon a shoal of them.* *τί δ' ἄν εἴποις* (Ib. 68, 122), *τί δεῖ τὰ πόρρω λέγειν* (I, p. 59), *μᾶλλον δέ* and the like are very common in some speeches, in others they are wanting. *καθάπερ* will occur four times on one page (Dind. II 528), and then again there will be a gap of two hundred pages.

4. *πολυσύνδετον*. This figure serves to lighten the mental labor of the hearer. It combines the related ideas, and the unity is discerned with slight effort. Moreover, it gives "einen Eindruck von Grösse und imponierender Fülle." In Demosthenes: 3, 14, 38, 43, 44, 49, 51, 53, 61, 68, 76, 77, 78, 84, 88, 98, 105, 107, 110, 119, 132, 137, 145, 146, 161. Particularly to be noticed for Grösse und Fülle are those in 68 and 77. In 78 we have one noteworthy for its contrast to the preceding asyndeton, and 88 for the repetition *δπως . . . δπως . . . δπως*.

In Aristeides: 3, 16, 28, 44, 60, 62, and none of these worthy

¹ Cf. Aristeides, Dind. I, pp. 725 and 739.

* Cf. Dind. I 86, *οἶμαι* three times in one section.

of special remark. For better examples see orations V and VIII, Dind. I 54, 89. The long involved sentence predominates in the sophist, while Demosthenes with great subtlety uses the short simple sentence, the long hypotactic construction, or what not, as the occasion seems to demand.

5. *ὀποφορά*. Demosthenes is especially fond of this figure. It is used as a transition-form, but with special design. It lends a peculiar liveliness to the discourse. Take, for example, §20: *οὐχοῦν τούτων μὲν οὐδετέρων οὐδεὶς διὰ τὸν νόμον ἡμῖν προσέσται χορηγός. ἀλλὰ νῆ Δί' εἰς τὰς τῶν μετοίκων λητουργίας εἰσποιεῖ πολλούς. ἀλλ' ἐὰν δεῖξῃ πέντε, ἐγὼ ληρεῖν ὁμολογῶ.* There is a sort of debate, a contest, carried on between the opposing parties, the speaker representing both sides. This alone is sufficient, in any form, to secure the interest of the jurymen. They watch the attacks on both sides with careful attention. In this tilt the orator, of course, comes off victorious; he has looked out for that beforehand. His victory is more valuable than if he had gained it in some other way. The orator's willingness to bring up his opponent's arguments and place them side by side with his own, gives him the appearance of not wishing to blind the jurors or prejudice them in his favor. This evidence of sincerity wins their confidence. He has argued his own side well, but not content with this, he bids the jurors look at the other side, which for the time being may have escaped their notice, and examine that too, and then with a sharp decisive conclusion shows the fallacy of such arguments. The remaining examples, introduced by *νῆ Δία*, occur in 3, 38, 56, 58, 75, 161.

Aristeides has one example, §14. In the *λόγος πρὸς Δημοσθένη* there are eight. In §10 he exclaims *φησὶ γοῶν*, and then quotes word for word the whole of the first section of Demosthenes' speech immediately following the short proem. The frequency with which this formula occurs in the speech against Demosthenes would at once indicate its more argumentative turn (the reminiscences of the orator's Leptinea are even more frequent here than in the other), while its absence in the speech against Leptines would go to show that Aristeides did not have any more knowledge of the contents of Leptines' speech than we have, although Demosthenes may have left the rhetorician very little room to make an elaborate refutation of Leptines' arguments. We must not lose sight of the nature of the phenomenon when we interpret statistics. So here in Demosthenes we find only

seven examples of *ὀποφορά*, and yet we are justified in saying that Demosthenes has an especial fondness for this figure, because the number of instances in which it *could* occur is necessarily small, whereas in the case of asyndeton, antithesis, and the like, a small number of examples would not indicate the author's predilection for the figure.

Under this head may be mentioned also the variety of transition-formulae which Demosthenes employs: *ἔτι τοίνυν ὑμᾶς χάκειν' ἐνθυμείσθαι δεῖ* (8 and frequently); *νομίζω τοίνυν ὑμᾶς ἄμεινον ἂν περὶ τοῦ παρόντος βουλευσασθαι, εἰ χάκεινο μάθοιτε* (15); *φέρει δὴ, καὶ τὰς εὐπορίας . . . δείξω* (26); *εἰ τοίνυν τις ὑμῶν ἐκεῖνο πέπεισται* (49); *οὐ τοίνυν μόνον . . . ἄξιόν ἐστιν εὐλαβηθῆναι* (50, quite common); *ἵνα τοίνυν εἰδῆτε* (88); *οἶμαι τοίνυν καὶ τοῦτον τὸν λόγον Λεπτίνην ἐρεῖν* (120); *ἔτι τοίνυν ἴσως ἐπισύροντες ἐροῦσιν* (131); *δ τοίνυν μάλιστα πάντων οἶμαι δεῖν ὑμᾶς φυλάξασθαι* (134); *καὶ μὴν οὐδ' ἐκεῖνου γ' ἀποστατίον τοῦ λόγου* (139); *καίτοι καὶ τοῦτ' ἀκούω σε λέγειν* (145); *παρὰ πάντα δὲ ταῦτ' ἐκεῖν' ἐτ' ἀκούσατέ μου* (160). Compare also 5, 7, 41, 67, 105, 112, 125, 143, 154. Although the single word *τοίνυν* constantly recurs, yet the variety of expressions would satisfy the most fastidious.

Here I may note also the repetition of the word *σκοπεῖν*, by means of which the attention of the juror is focussed on the point in question. The orator dwells longer on the subject, and sufficient time is given for the words to penetrate and make the desired impression. The examples are: 19, 20, 40, 43, 45, 54, 56, 57, 68, 74, 83, 87, 130, 146, 163. Of these four are followed by the imperative (or equivalent) of *λογίζομαι*. In many places we find synonyms: *θεωρήσατε* (31), *θεωρεῖτε* (44), *φέρει δὴ χάκειν' ἐξετάζομεν*. Again, how Demosthenes varies his expressions is shown by *πρέπον* (8), *ἥρμοττεν* (66, 86), *προσῆκεν* (114, 119), *πρέπει* (157); *τὸ ψήφισμα τοῦτο τὸ τότε αὐτῷ γραφέν* (42), *τὸ ψ. τοῦτο τὸ τότε ψηφισθὲν τῷ ἀνδρὶ* (44), *τὰ ψηφίσμαθ' ἃ . . . ἐγράφη* (63).

Aristeides is not very happy in his selection of transition expressions. The charm and vigor given to the style of Demosthenes by his admirable choice is totally wanting in the rhetorician. Either the subject is introduced by a long conditional clause, or it is patched to the preceding by some short phrase like *χωρὶς δὲ τούτων, ἄνευ δὲ τούτων*, or a small link like *σκοπεῖτε δὲ χάκεινως* is inserted, which informs you that a new subject is to be handled, or, as in 31, the pet phrase *μᾶλλον δ' ἀνάγκη δυοῖν θάτερον* is brought in again, indicating that one bubble has burst and another is about to be blown.

6. *παράλειψις*. This figure is used by Demosthenes with wonderful shrewdness and calculation: 2, 33, 76, 90, 99, 107, 157, 163. On the example in 76 Blass says: "Hier steht die Figur zu Anfang einer Schilderung und dient dazu die Nachfolgende, was nun wirklich gesagt werden soll, zu heben, indem auch das Uebergangene schon so gross erscheint." This remark, the truth of which is so obvious here, applies to other cases as well. In 157 it is used with equal effect *after* what he really intends the jury-men to hear: *κακῶς ἔχων ὁ νόμος καὶ ὁμοίως φθόνῳ τινὶ καὶ φιλονεικίᾳ καὶ—τὸ λοιπὸν ἐῶ*. The sudden breaking off adds great liveliness. Here we see the *δεινότης* again; it would be an easy matter to enumerate the rest, but would only consume time.

Aristeides has one example with *ἐῶ* (8), and that without especial gain, and two with *σιωπῶ* (27, 64); perhaps another in 98. In the *λόγος πρὸς Δημοσθένη* there are none. They are found occasionally in the other speeches.¹

7. *ἀναστροφή*. A genuine example of this figure is wanting in Demosthenes. In Aristeides: *σαφῶς ἀποδέδεικται, δέδεικται* (22); *σπουδῆν εἰσφερόντων, εἰσφέρουσι* (24); *λητουργιῶν ἡμῖν δεῖ· δεῖ γὰρ* (24); *τοὺς ἔχοντας τούτων ἀποστερήσομεν, ἀποστερήσομεν καὶ ἡμᾶς αὐτούς* (50); *τοῦτο παθῶν, παθῶν δὲ οὐ δυσχερανεῖ* (101). Cf. 28 and Dind. I, p. 49; II 492.

8. *ἐπαναδίπλωσις*. It is significant that this figure is not found in Demosthenes' oration; it is but another mark of the style as regards the freedom from passion.

We should expect to find this figure in Aristeides, and are not disappointed: 5, 53, 61, 78, 98. Blass (I 68) says that this figure is "der epideiktischen Beredsamkeit überhaupt nothwendig fremd." Although Aristeides is largely epideictic, we find this figure for the most part only in the non-epideictic parts. In the *λόγος πρὸς Δημοσθένη* 56, 64, 66. Conspicuous examples: Dind. I, pp. 11, 28, 89, 95, 96, 103, 108, 123, 393, 421, 619, 749, 760, 762, 774; II 129, 258, 381, 383, 404.

9. *ὑπέρβατον*. *ἐάν* postpositive: 22, 25, 34; *εἰ*, 46, 61, 99, 100: *τοὺς τοῦ τοιοῦτου παῖδας εἰ μηδεμίαν ποτησάμενοι μηδενὸς μνείαν*, where the first four words are made more prominent by the position of *εἰ*; *ἐκείνως εἰ λογίσαισθε*, to avoid hiatus; *μίαν μὲν πόλιν εἰ ἀπώλεσεν*, special stress on *μίαν πόλιν*, since hiatus would have been avoided if *εἰ* had been placed first; *ἄλλον εἴ τινα βούλεται*, to avoid hiatus.

Aristeides has three examples of *εἰ* postpositive (21, 46, 60), none of *ἐάν*.

¹ Cf. Dind. I 401, 555.

Other marked examples in Demosthenes: τῆ δὲ τιμῆ τὰς παρὰ τῶν δήμων δωρεὰς εὐρήσειτ' οὐσας βελτίους (15); οὐδεὶς διὰ τὸν νόμον ἡμῖν προσέσται χορηγός (19). Cf. 20, 27, 28, 31, 32, 42, 59, 70, 75, 76, 91, 93, 99, 101, 104, 105, 110, 111, 120, 123, 127. Noteworthy is the position of αὐτοῦ in χρήματα μὲν γὰρ ἔστιν αἰεὶ παρ' ὑμῖν αὐτοῦ (40), and quite remarkable that of εἵνεκα in τοῦ παρακρούσασθαι καὶ φενακίσαι λέγεται παρ' ἡμῶν εἵνεκα. In 127 we have τοῦτον ἔχει τὸν τρόπον, a type especially common, and one which Aristeides uses extensively also. In most cases the design of the orator can be perceived: a certain word is to be made emphatic, hiatus to be avoided, a previous thought to be revived.

The rhetorician does not fall behind Demosthenes in the use of hyperbaton. It looks very much, however, as if he overdoes it: τῆς ἀγαθῆς καὶ τὴν πόλιν ἐξ ἀρχῆς λαχούσης ἀντιπαλὸς τύχης (3), ἷς καὶ τοὺς εὐεργέτας ἢ πόλις ἠξίωσεν ἀτέλειας (30), the latter being a type particularly common. There are about 57 marked examples of this class of sentences. The noticeable hyperbaton κατ' αὐτὸς αὐτοῦ occurs in 87, 94, 100, and in the λόγος πρὸς Δημοσθένη in 2, παρ' αὐτὸς σαυτὸν in 8, κατ' αὐτὸς σαυτοῦ in 60, ὑπὲρ αὐτὸς σαυτοῦ in 74. Here might be mentioned also the enormous mass of words coming between the article and its noun or infinitive so characteristic of Aristeides. In imitating Demosthenes he goes beyond all bounds.¹

In order to present the thought in the clearest manner Demosthenes frequently places the relative clause first, often beginning the principal clause with the demonstrative: εἰθ' ἷς πᾶσι μέτεστι τὸ ἡμῖν, καὶ τοῖς μῆδ' ὀτιοῦν ἀγαθὸν πεποιηκόσιν ὁμᾶς, ταύτης τοὺς εἰδὸς ποιήσαντας, ἃ προστεθείκαμεν αὐτοῖς, ταῦτ' ἀφελώμεθα; (8). Others in 16, 17, 122. Under this head may come also relative adverb clauses: ὡς, 36, ἵνα 22 and frequently. See Demetrios περὶ ἐρμηνείας 20 and Blass, p. 128.

This type is also frequent in Aristeides: δι' ὧν μόνος τῶν πάντων ἀναιρεῖν ταύτην πειράται . . . διὰ τούτων οὐχ ἥμισυ πάντων.

10. παρένθεσις. Hermogenes says this figure adds liveliness. One of the prominent features of the Leptinea is the use of parentheses (another support to the signification I have given to the γραφικώτατος of D. H.). In 44 the parenthesis does not merely add a statement which strengthens what precedes, but serves to bring into greater prominence τὸ πιστεύειν immediately following. Others occur in 45, 74, 94, 102, 109, 139, 143. Observe how

¹ Cf. 34 (τῆν . . . συντέλειαν) and the last sentence of 49.

cleverly Demosthenes uses them in the four last. Not only is great adroitness displayed, but a certain naturalness is given to the mode of speaking; and what follows has, by reason of the parenthesis, greater force. In 94 the assertion about to be made is toned down in a degree, and does not strike the ears of the jurors harshly. εἰ δ' οὗτοι τοῦτο φήσουσι (δειξαι γὰρ οὐκ ἔχουσιν) (139) and εἰ μὲν τοίνυν ἠγγόησε ταῦτα (γένοιτο γὰρ ἂν καὶ τοῦτο), (143) show the δεινότης of the orator, how well he knew what means to employ in each particular instance to overcome his adversary.

Aristeides has not a single example of parenthesis in the speech against Leptines. In the companion speech he has four, the first two of which (1, 50) are very long, the other two (56, 58) rather short. In the speech against Demosthenes the rhetorician does not soar quite so high; he is more argumentative. We find the same abuse of his opponent, however, the same mass of statements lacking proof. His parentheses are far less effective than those of Demosthenes. I find them scattered here and there through his 55 orations; the majority are very long; *not one* can compare to those cited from Demosthenes for liveliness or δεινότης.

11. *χιασμοί*. Demosthenes: 6, 50. Aristeides: 24, 27, 50, 63, 64, 65.

12. *Alliteration*.¹ This is not especially frequent in either. Demosthenes: πεπόνθατε τῶν πάντων, ἀλλὰ καὶ ψηφίσματα πολλὰ πολ-
λάκις ἐξαπατηθέντες (3); μυριάδας μυρίους δίδωσι μεδίμνους ἡμῖν (32);
μηδεμίαν ποιησάμενοι τούτων μηδενὸς μείαν (46); πρῶτος πάλιν περὶ
τῆς ἡγεμονίας ἐποίησε τῇ πόλει (68). See also 30, 31, 76, 91, 101.

Aristeides: καὶ κακῶν κάκιστοι καὶ δεῖ δοῦναι δίκην (60). Cf. 2, 13, 75, 100, 108, 109, and Dind. I, pp. 117, 374.

13. *Combination of synonyms*. Demosthenes has 28 examples, Aristeides 6. This is another gnomon of style. The disparity in the numbers indicates at once one of the differences between the orator and his imitator. The one calls a halt, as it were, when he has reached an important argument, and by using two synonymous words dwells longer upon the thought, inducing the jurors to observe more closely and grasp its full significance; the other obtains fullness of expression in another way, not discriminating

¹ For the effect of the different letters in alliteration see Dionysios of Halikarnassos, de compositione verborum, c. 14. Cf. Rehdantz, Dem. Philipp. Reden, p. 156.

so nicely with regard to points that require emphasis, and seldom employing the means just referred to, but striving to make every sentence, whether the sense demands it or not, sound as full as possible.

Two figures remain to be mentioned here: *κύκλος* and *παρονομασία*. Of the former we have §73 of Demosthenes cited as an example by the grammarians: *λέγεται . . . λέγεται*. In Aristeides 14 there is an approach to it. *παρονομασία* does not appear in Demosthenes at all. In the sophist it occurs several times, the most marked example being in 91: *ἀνομωτάτων καὶ ἁμοιότατων*. See also Dind. I 400: *ἴδιον μὲν οὐδὲν οὔτε ἐδρηχα οὐτ' εἴρηχα (παρηχησις)*, and II 306: *ἡτύχεις, μᾶλλον δὲ καὶ ἡτύχεις*. Dind. II 516: *μὴ φρονήματι μόνον, ἀλλὰ καὶ καταφρονήματι*.

V.—MISCELLANEOUS.

In this part of my paper grammar will play the chief part. "As an art, grammar entered largely into antique aesthetic criticism. The ancient models were studied with a view to imitation, and the analysis extended to every element of discourse. Nothing that had been recognized as characteristic was overlooked."¹

The periphrasis with the verb *φαίνεσθαι* is a favorite term with Demosthenes; it scarcely makes its appearance in Aristeides. The large use of *φαίνεσθαι* and *δοκεῖν* points to the fact that Demosthenes based many of his arguments on what *seemed* right, what *appeared* just. By their use, also, he obtains fullness of expression. The periphrasis with *φαίνεσθαι* occurs 22 times: eleven with the present participle, ten with the perfect, one with the aorist.² *ἀφηρημένοι* occurs very often—quite significant, since it is the very point on which Demosthenes feels obliged to hammer continually. *φαίνεσθαι* alone appears nine times. Other periphrases are not rare: *ἀφηρηκῶς ἔσει* (17), *ἔσειθ' ἐψηφισμένοι* (166), etc.

Aristeides has but one example with *φαίνεσθαι*: *ἀγνωμονοῦντες φανῶμεν* (25). The periphrasis with *εἶναι* is frequent. *φαίνεσθαι* alone is rare. The proportion of Demosthenes' use of *δοκεῖν* to that of Aristeides is 3 to 4.³

Another favorite means of heightening the effect is the use of *ἀγνοεῖν*, generally with a negative or equivalent: 34, 56, 105, 119, 143 (bis), 165. Aristeides has the verb but once.

¹ Gildersleeve, *Grammar and Aesthetics*, p. 144 of his *Essays and Studies*.

² On the effect of the periphrasis see Alexander, *A. J. P.* IV 291-308.

³ Cf. *δοκῶν καὶ ὄν* (Dem. 82) with *δοκῶσιν καὶ ὄσιν* (Ar. 36).

Demosthenes has but one formula for an oath in the Leptinea outside of the *δοφορά* (except *μὰ τοὺς θεοὺς* (21) and *νῆ τοὺς θεοὺς* (151)), and that is *πρὸς Διός*. It occurs five times; *νῆ Δία* is found seven times.

From the way Aristeides rants we should expect a whole batch of oaths. The fact is he does not swear at all. This is compensated for in a manner by his abuse of Leptines. He does not even make use of exclamations until near the end. The first is *Ἡράκλεις* (82, 111), the next *ὦ τάν* (87), then *ὦ θεοὶ* (91, 105), *ὦ οὔτος* (95). In the oration against Demosthenes we find a few oaths: *μὴ Δία* (15, 66), *νῆ Δία* (23, 59), *οὔ μὰ Δία* (64). Only three exclamations: *ὦ τάν* (30), *ὦ οὔτος* (49), *ὦ Ζεῦ* (65); Demosthenes in his Leptinea has but two: *ὦ γῆ καὶ θεοί* (96) and *ὦ Ζεῦ καὶ θεοί* (167).

In the rest of his works Aristeides swears but rarely. This is due, doubtless, to the peculiar religious attitude of his mind. His great model, Demosthenes, is followed in all the by-ways, in all the minutiae of his art, but the use of this weapon, so effectively employed by the orator, the rhetorician does not venture to imitate. Of the exclamation, however, I doubt if any prose writer, classic or post-classic, has made such abundant use. Some orations literally swarm with them—some, of course, from their nature require many, but Aristeides overdoes it. See, for examples, Dind. I, pp. 112, 129, 133, 145, 426, 645. When he does use an oath he will sometimes connect it with an interjection, as Dind. II 421, *ὦ πρὸς Διός*.

As we should expect, Aristeides makes references to the gods very often. We meet with the expression *μετὰ τοὺς θεοὺς* in the very first paragraph, and find *θεῶν βουλομένων* in the last.¹ The gods are mentioned 36 times, making an average of once to every three sections: *μετὰ τοὺς θεοὺς* occurs five times, *θεῶν βουλομένων* four times, *θεῶν διδόντων* once.² In Demosthenes the gods are hardly mentioned. This is indication of the respective mental atmospheres of the two orators.

The famous Demosthenean formula, *διὰ τὴν*, is found in the Leptinea three times (5, 8, 140). This we should expect his imitator to use, and meet with it in 19, 34, 102. Aristeides makes extensive use of this phrase in his other works. The question in general,

¹ Notice this expression, instead of the classic *θεῶν θελώντων*.

² In the fifth of the *ἱεροὶ λόγοι*, Dind. I 545, we have *σοῦ γε, ἔφην, βουλομένου, βασιλεῦ*.

too, he employs as frequently as Demosthenes; nor is he much inferior to the latter in the use of it. The question is one of the most interesting of the gnomons of style. The rhetorical question gives great liveliness.¹

With all his pains in imitating Demosthenes the rhetorician often misses the mark. This is especially the case in the use of the perfect. The effect produced in 35, for example, by this tense (cf. 54) is seldom found in Aristeides. In the following statistics I exclude, of course, all such forms as *τεθνάναι*, *μεμνησθαι*.

The perf. infin. occurs with the article in Demosthenes twice: *τὸ γεγράφθαι* (29), *τὸ δεδωκέναι* (31). The whole number of perfects is 155—29 non-articular infinitives, 58 finite verbs, 66 participles. Observe the fluctuation *πεπραγμένα* (68, 80), *πραχθέντα* (64, 87).

In the Leptinea of Aristeides the whole number of perfects is 191—25 articular infinitives, 48 non-articular (7 are so-called subjects, 1 in O. O., 3 after *ἐφ' ᾧ*, 6 after *ὡς*),² 47 finite verbs, 71 participles. In 39 we have *ὡς ἐρίσαι* followed by *πεποιτῆσθαι*, and in 45 *τοῦ βεβουλεῦσθαι καὶ δρᾶσαι*, and in 49 *διὰ τὸ . . . προστῆναι . . . καὶ εἰσηνοχέναι*. The *λόγος πρὸς Δημοσθένη* contains 26 perfect infinitives with the article. So we see that the articular infinitive, scarcely showing itself in Homer, used chiefly in the aor. in Pindar, only once in Herodotus in the perf., appearing only in the pres. and aor. in Aristophanes and the tragedians, not common in the perf. even in Thukydides, and occurring but rarely in Plato and Xenophon,³ has spread to such an extent that Aristeides uses it 51 times even with the perf. in two orations.⁴ The dative artic. inf., which in the classic language is far less common than the genitive,⁵ occurs quite as often as any other form. It would hardly pay to count all the constructions of the artic. inf. in Aristeides; it is sufficient to notice how familiarly he employs the most daring of this class and to count only the rare combinations. The number of prepositions construed, in the early language, with the artic. inf. was very limited.⁶ Aristeides uses freely most of

¹ Cf. Dind. I 26.

² The perf. inf. is rare in any construction in classic Greek. Although Dem. has a goodly number in the Leptinea, he is outdone by Aristeides.

³ See A. J. P. III 201.

⁴ What complexes Arist. uses with the art. inf., as one example out of many, is seen in XXI, Dind. I 430.

⁵ For the best of reasons (see Amer. Journ. Philol. III 201). The infin. is a dative still.

⁶ See Professor Gildersleeve's article, Amer. Journ. Philol. III, p. 195 sqq.

the prepositions in this construction. I venture to say he uses as many as Thukydides (15), if not as many as Plato (25).¹ The place for the articular inf. is in the argument. Here, and here alone, do we find it used extensively by Demosthenes. Aristeides uses it in the narrative as well, e. g. Dind. I 109, 110, 111, 148, 158, 166, 167, 180, 181, 182, 187, 188, 189, 198, 211, 213, 214, 227, 228, 233, 247, etc.²

"The position of the article with the adjective and substantive is really a stronghold of aestheticism." Demosthenes has 54 examples (including possessive pronouns) of the normal position (*ὁ ἀγαθὸς ἀνὴρ*), 85 of words and phrases of adjectival value. Of the oratorical position (*ὁ ἀνὴρ ὁ ἀγαθός*) there are 19 examples, and 7 slipshod (*ἀνὴρ ὁ ἀγαθός*). Five of the latter are proper names (the favorite position with such), and the other two abstract nouns, which "rank with proper names." Of the possessive pronouns two are oratorical and six normal. *οὗτος ὁ νόμος* occurs 27 times, *ὁ νόμος οὗτος* 14, *τόνδε τὸν νόμον* twice; *ἅπαντα τὸν χρόνον* five times, *τὸν ἅπαντα χρόνον* once; *πᾶς* in the so-called predicative position 17, normal 6 times. Hence we see that the normal position is used three times as often as the oratorical, both in the case of adjectives and of pronouns—another indication of the simplicity of style.

Aristeides has 59 examples of adjectives in the normal position (*3 τὸν ἅπαντα χρόνον*), 82 of words and phrases of adjectival value—almost identical in number with those of Demosthenes. Of the oratorical position there are 6 examples, and 3 of the slipshod. The latter, however, being proper names, hardly count. The examples of the slipshod position in the whole corpus of Aristeides is exceedingly rare. We find one in the speech *εἰς βασιλέα*, Dind. I 109, *ἐπιθυμίας τῆς τοιαύτης*. Of the possessive pronouns 13 are in the normal position, 1 is oratorical and 1 slipshod. In the speech against Demosthenes there are three in the normal, none in the oratorical position. *τοῦτο τὸ μέρος* appears 6 times, *τὸ . . . τουτὶ φρόνημα* twice, and in 60 *οὗτος ἔρανος*. In the predicative position *πᾶς* occurs 19 times (5 with *πᾶς* after the substantive), normal not once; *πάντες ἄνθρωποι* is more common than *πάντες οἱ ἄνθρωποι*, while Demosthenes seldom, if ever, omits the article. The ratio, then, of the oratorical to the normal in Demosthenes is about 1 to 3, in Aristeides 1 to 10, counting simply the

¹ A. J. P. III 201.

² On the excess of the artic. inf. in Arist. see A. J. P. VIII 337, note.

adjectives. With regard to the possessive pronouns the difference is still greater, the ratio for Demosthenes being 1 to 3 (the same as for the adjective), while for Aristeides it is 1 to 13. Hence we conclude that Aristeides, like the most of late Greek writers, failed to grasp the language in its finer shades and more subtle variations.

The trisyllabic form *ἐαυτοῦ*, etc., is found in Demosthenes (Wolf's text) 12 times, and the dissyllabic form *ἀυτοῦ*, etc., 13.

Aristeides has the trisyllabic form 8 times, the dissyllabic 4, but all the latter in similar phrases, *ἀττὴν πρὸς ἀττὴν* (74) and *κατ' ἀττὸς ἀυτοῦ*.¹ The form *σεαυτοῦ* is found once, *σαυτοῦ*, etc., four times, neither appearing in Demosthenes. The trisyllabic form *ἐαυτοῦ*, etc., occurs in the *λόγος πρὸς Δημοσθένη* six times, the dissyllabic not at all, while *σαυτοῦ*, etc., appears five times, *σαυτοῦ*, etc., not at all. These two speeches may be taken as a fair sample of Aristeides' usage in this respect: the forms *ἀυτοῦ*, etc., occur in the other speeches, but are far outnumbered by the trisyllabic forms.

The position of the partitive genitive in the two speeches is interesting. Demosthenes is bound by no rule; the same phrase will be differently arranged in successive paragraphs. Of the genitive before the substantive on which it depends he has 31 examples, of the genitive following 42. Aristeides has 37 instances of the latter and only 4 of the former (excluding *δουὶν θάτερον*, a fixed phrase).

In 4 cases out of a possible 14 Demosthenes repeats the preposition of a compound verb before the substantive, Aristeides twice out of a possible 43; the ratio of the repetition of the preposition to the omission of it being, consequently, 2 to 5 in the orator and 2 to 41 in the rhetorician.

The combination of words with *τε . . . τε* is not Attic, but sentences can be so connected. The former construction occurs in early Greek, and comes up again in the later language. Aristeides makes but sparing use of it, four examples appearing in the speech in question (58, 67, 77, 110), one of which (67) may

¹ That Isokrates regularly uses *ἀυροῦ*, and not *ἐαυροῦ*, is well known. So in the tragic poets *ἀυροῦ* is the rule. In Aristophanes *ἐαυροῦ* makes a better showing. "It is sufficiently characteristic of the stateliness of Isokrates that he should have followed the tragic standard, rather than that of comedy, rather than of the inscriptions, in which the trisyllabic forms prevail over the dissyllabic (30 : 14)," Gildersleeve, Review of Keil's *Analecta Isocratea*, A. J. P. VI 108.

be considered a quotation. The combination occurs but twice in Demosthenes (16, 50), and in both instances, of course, sentences are connected. Demosthenes has *τε . . . και* (which is used in leisurely prose) eight times (2, 34, 78, 90, 97, 130, 154, 166); it occurs just three times as often in Aristeides. *οὔτε . . . οὔτε* is found in the orator seven times (8, 105, 121, 130, 133, 147, 165), *οὔτε . . . τε* once (76), *μήτε . . . μήτε* five times (4, 101, 109, 113, 116). The sophist has *οὔτε . . . οὔτε* only four times (12, 29, 62, 97), *μήτε . . . μήτε* thrice.

The verbal in *-τέος, -τέον* is a gnomon of style. It was used in the common spoken language before it was taken up into literature, and never keeps very high company. It is used more freely in speeches, being more convenient and concise. If Aristeides used the Greek language with a proper sense of all classic distinctions, the statistics with regard to the verbal adjective would form additional proof of the views above enounced, or would confirm the exceedingly high-flown character of his style, but the later Greeks had no vision or feeling; and although Aristeides was somewhat above the common herd in this respect, we cannot build upon these statistics. In Demosthenes we have seven examples: *σχεπτέον* (10), *λεχτέον* (24), *ἔξεταστέον* (57), *ἀκουστέον* (130), *ἀποστατέον* (139), *φευχτέον* (140), *σπουδαστέον* (154); Aristeides has but two: *θετέον* (7), *προσεκτέον* (17). The number of cases of *δεῖ* with the inf. is almost the same in both: Demosthenes 35, Aristeides 36. Karlowa, zehntes Programm der Evangel. Fürstenschule zu Pless., p. 13, says: "Das adjectivum verbale findet sich unpersönlich konstruiert 22 mal in den echten, 4 mal in unechten Reden (Dem.); persönlich konst. 6 mal. Die von Küh. u. Kr. angegebene Regel dass die pers. Konstruktion gewählt werde, wenn das Subjekt als Hauptbegriff hervortrete findet auf Dem. keine Anwendung." It will be noticed that all the above verbals are construed impersonally. Observing that the verbal is so rare in the speech against Leptines, I have been at the pains to count all the instances in the fifty-five orations of Aristeides. The total number is 77. The oration we are studying, then, has its proportion. Of these 77 only 3 are construed personally: *ρήτέος* (I 622), *τιμητέος* (II 430), *λεχτέος* (II 441). Consequently, in Demosthenes (genuine orations) pers. constr. : imp. constr. : : 3 : 11; in Aristeides pers. constr. : imp. constr. : : 3 : 77. A great many speeches have none; here there will be three examples on as many pages (I 86, 87, 88), there none will appear

for almost 200 pages. They are especially frequent in those speeches which belong to the same class as the speech against Leptines.

Demosthenes has two examples of *ὥσπερ* (137, 152), and, as we should expect, none of *καθάπερ*. In Aristeides we find *ὥσπερ* continuously (4, 12, 21, 40, 50) until we come to 61, where we meet with *καθάπερ*; then *ὥσπερ* again (76, 78, 102, 107), ten in all. *καθάπερ* occurs again in 104, and in the companion speech, sections 22, 25, 34, 42. *καθάπερ* has a legal coloring in classic Greek, but in the later language largely usurps the place of *ὥσπερ*. The rare occurrence of *καθάπερ* in the two speeches concerning the immunity has led me to investigate further and note how familiarly he uses it in the rest of his works, see how closely he follows the Attic usage.¹ In the following speeches: Dionysos, Herakles, To Asklepios, Asklepiadai, To Sarapis, and To the Emperor, *καθάπερ* occurs but three times, whereas *ὥσπερ* appears just fifty; in some of them it fairly swarms, e. g. Dind. I, p. 68, three in five lines; p. 81, three in four lines; p. 103, five on one page. But we also have swarms of *καθαπερ*'s: in the speech preceding Dionysos *καθάπερ* is found seven times, five in the compass of one page (I 38). Here, again, we have evidence of what I said in the beginning: Aristeides takes up a construction, a form, a word, as a child would a toy, uses it because he thinks it pretty, uses, then abuses it, and finally tires and throws it away.² The number of instances in the whole corpus of Aristeides is 74, almost the same as the verbal adjective.

Among the many Herodotean expressions taken up in later Greek is *τοῦτο μὲν . . . τοῦτο δέ*, and while it occurs here and there in Attic, and is even found in the Leptinea of Demosthenes (59),³ it is in full bloom again in Aristeides. He uses it 39 times altogether, once in our speech (104) and twice in the companion

¹G. Kaibel, in *Hermes*, 1885, III (Dionysius von Halikarnass und die Sophistik), shows the influence which the historical writings of Dionysios exercised upon Appian, Aristeides and others. He says that in the classical school founded by Isokrates and continued by Ephoros, Theopompos, etc., are to be found the models and ideals of Dionysios, who is a connecting link between the two eras.

²Cf. II 528, four on one page.

³See also IX 11 and XX 59. The formula is rare in the Attic orators, except those of the transition period, viz. Antiphon and Andokides. In the first and fifth speeches of the former it is esp. frequent: V 5, 11, 26, 31, 50, etc. See I 103, II 16, 17, 40 of Andok.

speech (38, 53). Another Herodotean expression, *καὶ δὴ καὶ*, occurs very often (I 473, 504, 505, 513, 514, 520, 527, etc.). Also *δοτεις* for *δος*.

The plural of *οὐδέεις*, though found quite frequently in classic Greek,¹ is used out of all proportion by Aristeides; you encounter it on almost every page. See the speech against Demosthenes 13, 39, 56. In like manner such phrases as *οὐδενὶ τῶν πάντων* (Dem. 8, 11, 40, etc.) are used very lavishly by the sophist (1, 28, 38, 39, 41, 47, 54, 67, 73, of the same speech). Aristeides evidently did not have the Platonic rage for *ποικιλία*. In 56 of the *λόγος πρὸς Δημοσθένη* we have *μόνοι τῶν πάντων* three times in five lines. Many other words and phrases the sophist uses *ad nauseam*, e. g. *καθάπαξ* averages about once to every page and *τὸ παράπαν* is exceedingly frequent; *καλὸν κάγαθοί* too, *ὡς ἀληθῶς*, *ὡς ἐγῶμαι*, *οἶμαι*, *ὡς εἰπεῖν*, and *εὐ οἶδα* are by no means rare.

Of the O. O. inf. with *μή* there is no example in Aristeides. After *μή* came to be used with the O. O. inf., it crept into the *δοτι* clause of O. O. too. There is no example in Aristeides of this either. We have one, however, with *ὡς*: *λογίζεσθαι . . . ὡς ἢ μή γνώμης εὐθύτητι παρέσχεν ἐκεῖνα*, but just below: *ὡς οὐ μετὰ λογισμοῦ τότε παρέσχεν*. Of causal *μή* there are two instances: *ἐπεὶ μηδὲ νόμον μᾶλλον ἐροῦμεν* (55); *τοὺς μὲν οὐκ ἀξιῶς τιμῶν, ἐπειδὴ μή καὶ πάντας*. In the use of the negative with the relative Aristeides does not diverge from classic Greek; all the examples in the speech against Leptines can be explained without setting them down as *falsae locutiones* of a late author. The sophist is not so careful in his handling of the negative with the participle. He falls into the habit of using *μή* where in the classic language you would more naturally expect *οὐ*; *μή* in later Greek became almost the exclusive negative with the participle.² Examples: *τόν δὲ μὴ μόνον ἡμᾶς . . . εἰς αἰσχρόνην . . . καθίσταντα Λεπτίνην*; *μηδ' ἤστινος οὖν προσηργμένης ἀνάγκης*, concessive (67); *ὡς μηδενὸς ὄντας ἀξίους*, O. O. third form (68); *μηδένα τούτου ποιούμενος λόγον*, causal (69); *μηδὲν χρηστὸν ἔχων βλως*, causal (71); *μηδὲν αἰσχυρόμενος γράφει*, circumstantial (75); *οἱ μὴ μόνον . . . διενεγκόντες*, definite relative (92). See further 94, 101, 106. Of course, cases will occur where the negative is different from what we should expect owing to some

¹ Lys. II 22; Isok. IV 57, V 52, VI 40, 41; Isaios, VIII 4 and 12; Dem. V 5 and 14.

² See Professor Gildersleeve's article, "Encroachment of *μή* on *οὐ*," A. J. P. I 55.

counter-influence, the peculiar construction of the sentence, the proximity of a disturbing factor, e. g. Dem. IV 18, *ἴνα . . . παριδὼν ταῦτα ἀφύλακτος ληφθῆ, μηδενὸς ὄντος ἐμποδῶν πλεῖν ἐπὶ τὴν ἐκείνου χάραν ὑμῖν*. Similar instances are found in Aristeides. A few more examples of *μή* for *οὐ* are: Panathenaikos, Dind. I 204, *δοκεῖ δέ μοι . . . τῆς πόλεως ἡ μάχη καὶ μηδέων ἄλλων εἶναι*; Panegyrikos in Kyzikos, I 393, *ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ . . . μηδ' ἂν οὕτω δέξασθαι*; Sikelikos, B, I 582, *μέχρι μὲν μηδεὶς ἀφίκτο; ὑπὲρ τῆς εἰρήνης* B, I 602, *οἶμαι δὲ μηδ' ἡμᾶς ἂν τοῦτό γε χρῆναι λέγειν*; Leuktrikos A, I 623, *μεμνημένοι τῆς συμμαχίας καὶ μή βουλόμενοι διαλθεῖν αὐτὴν φανοῦμεθα*.

But Aristeides does not seem to sin in this direction more than in the opposite, viz. in using *οὐ* for *μή*. This is especially true of the conditional sentence: *εἰ μὲν οὐδέσιν ἄλλοις . . . ἐνῆν* (16); *εἴπερ λητουργεῖν μὲν οὐκ ἔνι* (23); *εἰ . . . λόγος οὐδ' εἰσισσοῦν αὐτοῖς ἦν* (37); *εἰ . . . τούτων οὐδὲν εἶλεν αὐτούς* (45); *εἰ . . . οὐκ ἀπῆλλαχται* (50); *εἰ μὲν . . . οὐ προσεῖχεσ δλωσ τὸν νοῦν* (76); *εἰ ἀρ' ἀξιόσ ἐστιν ἀτήρ οὐκ ἀτελείας μόνον* (103); *εἰ μὲν . . . εὖ ποιεῖν δὲ οὐ προσῆν* (109); *εἰ δ' οὐκ ἀνεκτὸν . . . τοῦτ ἦδη* (112). The rhetorician seems to use both indiscriminately in the conditional clauses with the indicative. In 79 we have *εἰ μή* with the gen. absol. We even find *οὐ* with *ἔταν* and the subj.: *ἔταν γὰρ ταύτη μὲν οὐδηγνινοῦν μέμφιν ἐπάγη*; also with *ὥστε* and the infin.: *ὥστ' οὐ μόνον αὐτοῦ λίθοις εὐθὺς ἀνελεῖν* (46).¹ With what little compunction Aristeides shifts from one negative to the other can be well illustrated by the following: *καὶ προσέτι δόξομεν ἢ τηνικαῦτα μή καλῶς βεβουλεῦσθαι . . . ἢ . . . νῦν οὐ καλῶς ἀφαιρεῖσθαι* (5); *τί μή πᾶσιν ἀπλῶς μεταδίδωσ, ἀλλὰ τοῖσ μὲν, τοῖσ δ' οὐ* (95); cf. 37 and 95.

The enormous range which *τοῦ* with the inf. has in non-classic Greek stands in striking contrast to the very limited use of it in Attic.² Aristeides, however, is true to his colors in this respect and uses the construction but rarely.

In his use of consecutive clauses the sophist is not so near the norm. There are 33 instances of *ὥσ* in a result clause (mostly c. inf.) in the speech adv. Leptinem alone, and 18 in the speech adv. Demosthenem. In the former there are 10 examples of *ὥστε*—1 with the indic., 3 with the infin., 6 = itaque; *ὥσ* = itaque occurs once. In the latter speech *ὥσ* for *οὕτως* appears twice (39, 73).

¹ Of course this occurs in classic Greek too, but is rare, e. g. Plato, Apol. 26 D. On this passage see A. J. P. VI 523, where other examples will be found. The passage from Aristeides is not parallel.

² A. J. P. IV 418.

If my memory is not at fault, *ὡς* consecutive occurs, however, far more frequently in these two speeches than in all the others put together. In the first nine in Dindorf's edition *ὡς* does not occur at all, whereas *ὥστε* is found some 30 times. In fact, if I can rely upon a rapid reading, *ὡς* consecutive does not appear before the Panathenaikos (XII), Dind. I 255, and after that, the following: 284, 356, 507, 526 (?); II 98, 553, 594—seven in all.

In the final clause Aristeides comes much nearer the Attic usage; *ἵνα* and *ὅπως* regularly, *ὡς* not at all, *ὡς ἄν* once (I 484).¹

If Isokrates and his school had such an influence upon the sophist (through Dionysios) as Kaibel (Hermes, 1885, III) maintains, Aristeides does not show it in the use of the preposition *σύν*. If he imitated any prose writer in this respect it must have been Xenophon, for he diverges considerably from model Attic. There are 55 instances of the use of the preposition *σύν* in the 55 orations, not counting *σύν θεοῖς* (good Attic), which occurs seven times, and *σύν θεῶν*, thrice, and *σύν χαρῶν*, which appears several times. How the sophist could have followed Isokrates to any great extent, when the latter laid so much stress on rhythm and the avoidance of hiatus, discarded entirely the trisyllabic form of the reflexive *ἑαυτοῦ*, etc., and the preposition *σύν*, which Aristeides uses extensively as well as other words, phrases, and constructions that are un-Isokratean, it is difficult to see.

Another un-Attic construction is *κελεύειν* with the dative, Dind. I 498.

Still more glaring is the use of *ὅτι* after *φάναι*. One may write the infin. after *εἰπεῖν* and feel that he has good company among the classic Greek authors, but no one who professes to write good Attic would be caught saying *φημι ὅτι*. Here we find Aristeides guilty again: Dind. II 439, 503, 508, 509 (bis), 519, 521.

οὐδὲτως is used to refer to what follows, Dind. II 498.

Thus we see that in syntax, as well as in other respects, this imitator of the Attic Greek compositions, though especially accurate in some usages, failed to see where he differed in others from the standard.

¹Cf. A. J. P. VI 58.



